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1 Introduction
[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
serve both its remedial and deterrent function.'
With these words, the Supreme Court assumed that the public goal of
ending workplace discrimination is achieved when individual employees arbi-
trate their claims in a fair and effective manner. This Article examines that
assumption and reaches a contrary conclusion: arbitration is not an effective
forum in which to satisfy the public policy goals of the employment discrimi-
nation statutes, even when employees are accorded a fair hearing.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,2 the Court ruled that an
employment discrimination statute does not bar the enforcement of a contrac-
tual agreement to arbitrate claims brought under that statute.3 As a result,
I. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
2. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (upholding
arbitration of claim arising under Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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employees who have agreed to arbitrate workplace disputes may not file
employment discrimination suits in court. This decision reallocates jurisdic-
tion over employment discrimination claims from the public judicial system
to a private forum.' Resolving workplace discrimination claims in a private
forum is problematic for at least two reasons. First, employees may find that
arbitration is a less congenial forum than litigation in a public court. Second,
the public goal of ending workplace discrimination may not be furthered when
parties arbitrate these cases. This Article focuses on the second issue.
The public obviously does not realize its interest in ending discrimination
if employees cannot enforce their statutory rights in the arbitration forum.
The converse presents a more complicated question: Is the public goal met
when arbitration vindicates individual rights? The question is of more than
theoretical interest because the answer has a bearing on significant issues that
Gilmer raised or left unanswered.' A proper resolution of these and other
4. See Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration ofPublic-
Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 678 (noting that Gilmer begins "potentially vast
reallocation of jurisdiction over employment disputes from civil courts and administrative
agencies to privately selected arbitrators"); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake ofGilmer, 14 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 1,
2 (1996) (stating that Supreme Court's arbitration decisions have "created the potential for
wholesale diversion of employment-related disputes.., from litigation to arbitration").
5. The Supreme Court has not determined the scope of a statutory exclusion regarding
classes of workers in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("[N]othing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."). Some courts have held that
the exclusion applies only to employees actually engaged in commerce. See, e.g., Cole v. Bums
Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that "every circuit to consider
this issue squarely has found that section I of the FAA exempts only the employment contracts
of workers actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce"); Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that "it seems to [the court] as
it did to the Third Circuit... that [the history of § 1] supports rather than undermines limiting
'engaging in Foreign or interstate commerce' to transportation"); Rojas v. T K Communications,
Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that court "agree[s] with the majority of other
courts which have addressed this issue and conclude[s] that § 1 is to be given a narrow read-
ing"); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We conclude that
the exclusionary clause of§ 1 of the Arbitration Act should be narrowly construed to employ-
ment contracts .... ).
Second, Supreme Court rulings have produced some tension between commercial
arbitration of employment discrimination claims and arbitration of these claims in unionized
settings. Although the Court recently heard a case that promised to resolve this problem, it
failed to reach the issue. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 397
(1998) ("We do not reach the question whether such a waiver [of judicial relief] would be
enforceable."); see also infra note 72 (discussing Wright).
Third, the circuits are split on the import of a provision in the 1991 Civil Rights Act that
has been interpreted both to encourage arbitration and to limit arbitration. Compare Duffield
v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998) (opining that Congress's
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issues is important also because a growing number of employers6 and busi-
intent in drafting § 118 was "to codify its position that 'compulsory arbitration' of Title VII
claims was not 'authorized by law' and that compelling employees to forego their rights to liti-
gate future Title VII claims as a condition of employment was 'not appropriate"') with Seus v.
John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that certain remarks in Congres-
sional committee report could not be interpreted to repeal impliedly FAA and disagreeing with
result reached in Duffield). See also infra text accompanying notes 316-18 (discussing § 118).
Fourth, the Ninth Circuit adopted a standard for the waiver of statutory rights that differs
from those in other circuits. Compare Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that employees must "knowingly contract to forego their statutory
remedies in favor of arbitration"), with Seas, 146 F.3d at 184 ("Nothing short of a showing of
fraud, duress, mistake, or some other ground recognized by the law applicable to contracts
generally would have excused the district court from enforcing [the plaintiff s] agreement."),
EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500, 504 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (calling
Prudential decision "widely criticized"), Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447,
1453-56 (D. Minn. 1996) (enforcing arbitration agreement against plaintiff who did not read
it), Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091, 1096-97 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (criticizing Prudential decision), andMaye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100, 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (distinguishing Prudential).
6. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINATION: MOSTPRIVATE-
SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVEDISPUTE RESOLUTION 7-8 (July 1995) (indicating that
10% of companies with more than 100 employees use private arbitration systems and additional
8.4% are considering option); David Lewin, Grievance Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces:
An EmpiricalAnalysis of Usage, Dynamics, and Outcomes, 66 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 823, 824-25
(1990) (finding that 17% of nonunion businesses had arbitration systems for manufacturing
employees, 24% used arbitration for clerical employees, 21% for professional and technical
employees, and 20% for managers); see also Mei Bickner et al., Developments in Employment
Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 78 (finding that employers implemented 85%
of arbitration procedures after Gilmer, with 20% ofthese implemented since 1995);ADR News:
500 Attend Superconference in Washington, 52 DISP. RESOL. J., Summer 1997, at 4, 5 (noting
that, as of summer 1996, American Arbitration Association administered ADR programs of
almost 300 large corporations covering 3.5 million workers).
Commentators conclude that employers will increasingly require employees to sign pre-
dispute compulsory arbitration agreements. See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRA-
TION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 32 (1997) (suggesting that employers are
hesitating until issues Gilmer raised are determined); Grodin, supra note 4, at 5 n.6 (noting
study that reveals numbers of employers requiring arbitration and establishing arbitration
procedures); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitrationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer,
44 HASTINGs L.J. 1187, 1188 (1993) (noting that increasing number of employers use arbitra-
tion); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contracts of the 1990s, 73 DENv. U. L. REV. 1017, 1043 (1996) (arguing that
litigation will diminish in discrimination area as employers channel more and more employees'
discrimination complaints into arbitration).
Anecdotal evidence supports commentators' views. See E. Patrick McDermott, Survey
of 92 Key Companies: Using ADR to Settle Employment Disputes, 50 DisP. RESOL. J., Jan.
1995, at 8, 12 (reporting that most companies surveyed were considering use of arbitration);
see also JanetNovack, SilverLining, FORBES,Nov. 21, 1994, at 124,125 (reporting thatBrown
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nesses7 have signaled their intention to arbitrate, rather than to litigate, statu-
tory claims. Moreover, in considering legislation that would limit arbitration
of employment discrimination claims, Congress should be aware that arbitra-
tion may not effectively achieve the public goal of eliminating discrimination
in the workplace.'
This Article considers whether achieving the public policy goal of ending
employment discrimination requires a public forum. Part II distinguishes liti-
gation from arbitration and reviews the history of commercial arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Part III presents Supreme Court
precedents that considered whether statutory claims could be arbitrated and
provides an analysis of Gilmer in the context of those cases. Part IV examines
the Supreme Court's assumption that vindication of employees' statutory
rights also vindicates the public interest. For the purposes of this analysis, the
discussion accepts the Court's premise that individuals may effectively
resolve their statutory rights in the arbitration forum.9 The analysis begins by
& Root and Hughes Aircraft have adopted arbitration); Companies UsingArbitration to Avoid
Court in Bias Cases, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Mar. 20, 1994, at R7 (reporting that several large
employers have adopted arbitration); Take This Job and... Promise Not to Sue, SACRAMENTO
BEE, July 7, 1996, at El (providing informal survey of 12 Silicon Valley companies that shows
over half of them had enacted compulsory arbitration policy).
7. See Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 267,
268 (1995) ("Financial institutions increasingly are requiring consumers to arbitrate rather than
resort to litigation."); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of CompelledArbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
33, 54-65 (arguing that widespread use of predispute arbitration clause will increase); Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
BindingArbitration, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637,637 (1996) (noting large companies such as banks,
hospitals, and brokerage houses include mandatory binding arbitration clauses in form con-
tracts); Ellie Winninghoff, In Arbitration, Pifallsfor Consumers, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1994,
at 377 (discussing predispute arbitration agreements in contracts with real estate and finance
companies, health care providers, and insurers).
8. Congress has introduced several bills that limit arbitration of employment discrimina-
tion suits. See S. 2012,103d Cong. (1994) (Protection From Coercive EmploymentAgreements
Act); S. 2405, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 4981, 103d Cong. (1994) (Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1994); S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995) (Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act).
9. Significant arguments to the contrary based on structural characteristics of arbitration
have yet to be addressed even as arbitration associations promulgate new rules to ensure fair
procedures. For instance, less formal adjudication systems may not be as effective as traditional
litigation for minorities and the poor. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359,
1388 (concluding thatformality ofadversarial adjudication deters prejudiced decisions). Butsee
generally E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
Majoritarian CulturalNorms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASEW. REs. L. REV.
275 (1999) (advocating arbitration as means to achieve minorities' testamentary instructions).
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examining the dual purposes of workplace discrimination laws: to remedy
instances of discrimination and to end workplace discrimination. To achieve
these purposes, Congress authorized individuals, and later the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), to sue employers in court.
Litigation of employment discrimination claims generates several en-
forcement mechanisms that are integral to securing the end of workplace
discrimination. Firstjudicial decisions, which speak with the authority ofthe
state, provide general deterrence of future violators. Second, the courts
develop and refine the law of employment discrimination, establish prece-
dents, and define a uniform standard. Finally, the judicial process educates
the community and forms public values, a crucial undertaking when a law
seeks to change public sentiment. Arbitration, because it is a nongovern-
mental, confidential, and final forum, does not generate these enforcement
mechanisms; thus, it is less effective in achieving the public policy objective.
The Court's assumption that remediation of individual claims in arbitration
will enforce the goals of the statutes does not bear scrutiny.
Notwithstanding that conclusion, the second goal of the statutes, to
provide remedial relief, must also be considered. Although inherent char-
acteristics of the private forum generally weigh against arbitrating employ-
Others suggestthat because the parties pay arbitrators fortheir services they operateunder
an institutionalized incentive to find for the party who is likely to be a repeat player. In the
realm of commercial arbitration, the employer is the repeat player in an employment discrimina-
tion suit. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives andArbitration: The Case Against Enforcement
of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV.
449, 452 (1996) ("[T]he arbitral agreement is suspect because the employer, like a merchant or
labor union, is a 'repeat player.' The employee, by contrast, is a one-shot player."); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature ofPrivate Adjudication, 6 YALEL. &POL'Y
REV. 42, 58-59 (1988) (finding that arbitrators may unconsciously cater to party that may
provide repeat business and noting also incentive of reputation that mitigates danger). See
generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS & EMPL. POL'Y J. 189 (1997) (analyzing arbitration process for repeat player effect and
discussing its implications). This concern is not new. See Julius G. Getman, LaborArbitration
andDispute Resolution, 88 YALEL.J. 916,928 (1979) (discussing repeat player effect in labor
arbitration); see also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(reviewing debate). The Supreme Court has turned aside such concerns. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,30 (1991) (declining to indulge presumption that
arbitral body conducting arbitration will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscien-
tious, and impartial arbitrators (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985))).
The demographic characteristics of arbitrators may also cause a perception of bias. See
SECURITIES ARBITRATIONREFORM, REPORTOF THEARBITRATIONPOLICYTASK FORCE 117 (Jan.
1996) [hereinafter RUDER REPORT] (noting that 97% of eligible securities arbitrators are white
and 89% are male with average age of 60); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES 2
(Mar. 1994) (finding that typical arbitrators in securities industry were older white males).
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ment discrimination claims, arbitration is the only viable forum for certain
employees because it generally offers affordable and expeditious resolu-
tion of claims. Thus, if arbitration affords full procedural and substantive
rights, it may be preferable to litigation for vindicating one purpose of the
employment discrimination statutes, to secure a remedy for workplace dis-
crimination.
In view of this conflict, Part V considers whether arbitration could be
modified so that it effects the public goal. The discussion focuses on institut-
ing judicial review of arbitration awards in claims of employment discrimina-
tion. The public interest in employment discrimination suits and the interest
of individual aggrieved employees justify the addition of judicial review.
Judicial review, however, necessarily includes written, reasoned, and accessi-
ble awards that increase the costs of arbitration. These increased costs render
the forum less attractive to the very employees who need a less expensive
alternative to litigation. Moreoverjudicial review may not generate sufficient
enforcement mechanisms to secure ultimately the public policy goal of ending
workplace discrimination.
Part VI takes a prospective view and notes that the arbitration debate
exposes a tension between the statute's two goals, to provide a remedy to
individuals who have suffered employment discrimination and to end discrim-
ination in the workplace. The characteristics of litigation and arbitration
highlight and exacerbate this tension. This dilemma should encourage discus-
sion of an alternate forum in which both goals of the employment discrimina-
tion law may be achieved.
II. Arbitration
Arbitration stands in sharp contrast to litigation. A trial is a public event
in which a publicly appointed judge renders a judgment by virtue of the
authority of the state." Financed through taxation, the civil justice system
derives its authority over civil disputes from the state's power to govern. The
judicial branch definitively applies coercive state power to issue judgment in
a visible, unbiased, accountable, and rationalized manner." Selected through
a process based on public assent and indirect public participation, judges are
public agents whose decisions are official acts." The civil judicial system
10. See Hazard & Scott, supra note 9, at 57.
11. See ia (citing attributes of public courts); Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the
Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891, 895 (1993) (citing attributes of coercive state power: open
hearings; impartial, unbiased, and rationalized decision-making; accountability because of
visibility; and public announcement of decision).
12. See Hazard& Scott, supra note 9, at57 (characterizingjudge as public agent speaking
ex officio).
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operates through open hearings, creates public records, and publishes rea-
soned decisions that explain the bases of judgments. 3 Because their judg-
ments and often the reasons for those decisions are part of a public record,
judges are accountable to the public, to higher courts, and to Congress, which
may amend court rulings through legislation. For these reasons, "[p]ublic
justice is public in the most obvious sense.'
4
Arbitration is a method of resolving disputes by voluntarily deferring to
the judgment of third parties who have been engaged by the disputants.'5
Arbitration is thus a substitute, or alternative, for formal, public adjudica-
tion.' 6 In contrast to the public nature of litigation, the defining characteristic
of arbitration is that it is a private system. Arbitration does not depend upon
and is not authorized by state power. Arbitrators receive their authority to
render a binding decision from the agreement of the parties to abide by that
decision, rather than from state authority. 7 Arbitrators are not officials of the
state, but are individuals acting in a private capacity who are selected by the
parties, commonly because of experience in a particular industry or knowl-
edge of the subject at issue. They work within a privately financed system
and are accountable only to the parties.
Arbitration is private in a second sense; arbitration and its outcomes are
generally confidential. Members of the public may not attend the hearings,
which are open only to the parties and their representatives. The forum does
not create a public record of filings, of the hearing, or of the award. In gen-
eral, the awards are simple statements of the disposition of the claims that do
not provide the reason for the award or an explanation of the grounds support-
ing it.' An arbitration award is virtually final because, although recourse to
13. See Robel, supra note 11, at 895.
14. See Hazard & Scott, supra note 9, at 57.
15. M.DOMKE, THELAWANDPRACTICEOFCOMMERCIALARBrrRATION 1 (G. Wilmered.,
1984); see IANR. MACNEIL, AMERICANARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 7 (1992) (defining arbitration).
16. See MACNEIL, supra note 15, at4 (pointing outthat term "alternative" in "alternative
dispute resolution" means alternative to state dispute resolution processes).
17. Once the arbiter renders a decision, arbitration relies on state power to enforce
agreements and to convert agreements to an enforceablejudgment. See Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 16 (1994) (allowing winners in arbitration to enforce judgment in court and to
appeal orders rendered in court concerning arbitration).
18. For example, a successful claim for compensatory and punitive damages for securities
fraud before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) may have alleged several
theories of fraud, such as churning accounts to increase sales commissions, misrepresentation,
and failure to supervise. Nevertheless, the award will not indicate why the arbitrators found for
the claimant. Although the document states the amount awarded, it does not indicate whether
the arbitrators awarded full compensation, partial compensation, or some measure of punitive
damages.
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the courts is nominally available under the FAA, the statute limits the grounds
for setting aside the arbitral award to egregious errors. 9
Litigation occurs within a unified, hierarchical judicial system that uses
past judgments to govern future cases heard by different courts. Under the
doctrine of stare decisis, courts do not lightly reverse prior decisions or
interpretive rules. This system allows an appellate court to constrain the
power of the trial court by reviewing the legal bases of decisions. In contrast,
arbitration occurs as a unique, isolated event that is not subject to review. As
a result, arbitrators neither create nor apply precedent.
Formal rules of procedure and evidence that protect the rights of both
parties govern the resolution of disputes within the official judicial system.
As creatures of contract,2" the choice of provisions in agreements to arbitrate
is practically unlimited.2 The parties adopt their own procedural rules or,
more commonly, agree to abide by those of a neutral agency.' Procedures of
the arbitration forum are generally less formal than those in civil litigation,
and as a consequence, the parties may resolve their problems more quickly,
and therefore less expensively, than they would in litigation.
Arbitration is one of many methods offered as part of Alternate Dispute
Resolution (ADR).' In recent years, ADR, and especially arbitration, has
become exceedingly popular.24 Commentators have suggested that the popu-
larity of arbitration may have impeded a full consideration of its capacity and
19. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (setting forth grounds for vacating arbitration decisions).
20. In the words of Justice Blackmun, the "'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements' ... is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual
arrangements." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985).
21. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
Judge Posner emphasized the contractual nature of arbitration: "[S]hort of authorizing trial by
battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to
whatever procedures they want to govern the arbitration of their disputes .... " Id.
22. See BALES, supra note 6, at 3 (listing American Arbitration Association and Center
for Public Resources). The NASD and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) sponsor
arbitration for members of the securities industry.
23. Other forms of ADR that are useful in resolving employment disputes are mediation
and settlement conferences, final offer arbitration, mixed mediation and arbitration, use of
ombudsperson, self-mediation, mini-trial, and contracting for private judging. See Stuart
Bompey et al., TheAttack onArbitration andMediation ofEmploymentDisputes, 13 LAB. LAW.
21, 69-82 (1997).
24. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997) (characterizing
language in 1991 Civil Rights Act that endorses arbitration as a "polite bow to the popularity
of 'alternative dispute resolution"); see also Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics
Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARAL. REV. 1055,1055 (1996) ("Congress, the federaljudiciary, adminis-
trative agencies, and citizens groups have all boarded the ADR train."); id. at 1056 (quoting
Judith Resnik: "[The ADR train] has already left the station").
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limitations.' In any event, the general popularity of commercial arbitration
results from a combination of factors: the expense and time involved in
litigation, the perceived efficiency of arbitration, the increasing difficulty of
scheduling civil cases in the federal courts, and the Supreme Court's support-
ive imprimatur of arbitration. In addition, some institutional parties prefer
arbitration because they believe it is a more favorable forum for them than
litigation.26 Arbitration has come a long way since it achieved Congressional
acceptance in 1925 with the passage of the FAA.27
A. The Federal Arbitration Act and Commercial Arbitration
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)28 in 1925 in order to
allow parties to avoid "the costliness and delays of litigation."29 Its drafters
hoped to reverse the common-law rule barring specific performance ofarbitra-
tion agreements and to secure a less expensive forum than litigation in which
to resolve factual disputes.3" The FAA has remained relatively unchanged
since its passage.31 Authorized by the Commerce Clause, the FAA applies to
maritime transactions and transactions involving commerce.32 Its centerpiece
is Section 2, which provides that "[a] written provision.., to arbitrat[e] ...
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."33 The FAA eliminates the federal
courts' power to hear a dispute that the parties have agreed to arbitrate, forcing
25. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternate Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668, 668 (1986) (voicing concern that arbitration "bandwagon may be on a
runaway course"); Yamamoto, supra note 24, at 1066 (surveying academic sources and wonder-
ing whether popularity of ADR has undermined legal discourse critical of it).
26. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 60-62 (suggesting that corporate defendants like
arbitration because it reduces their costs and liability).
27. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 42 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (doubting that legislators who enacted FAA expected it to cover statutory claims);
MACNELM, supra note 15, at 169 (noting legitimation of arbitration as universal dispute resolu-
tion technique probably goes far beyond Congress's original intent).
28. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
29. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
68-96, at 1-2 (1924) and S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924)).
30. American law inherited the English courts' refusal to enforce arbitration agreements
because they viewed such agreements as an effort to deprive the courts ofjurisdiction. Scherk,
417 U.S. at 510 n.4; see MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 28-30 (recounting goals of early advocates
of arbitration).
31. See E. WENDY TRACHT-HuBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DisPUTE
REsoLUTION: STRATEG ES FOR LAW AND BusINEss 605 (1996) (noting that this characteristic
permits flexibility but "also generates litigation aboutthe meaning and application ofthe [FAA]").
32. 9 U.S.C. § 1; see PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood& ConklinMfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,405
(1967) (noting that FAA is based on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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district courts to stay litigation.34 The FAA also instructs courts to compel
arbitration when one party inappropriately refuses to arbitrate;35 further, the
FAA authorizes interlocutory appeal ofa trial court's decision to refuse a stay
of litigation.36 Other provisions of the FAA authorize appointment of arbitra-
tors, hearing procedures, awards, modifications, and appeals. 7 The FAA
governs agreements to arbitrate employment disputes that are contained in
individual employee contracts. Arbitration clauses are, however, a key feature
of the collective bargaining agreements negotiated in unionized workplaces.
B. Federal Labor Law and Labor Arbitration
Parties to a collective bargaining agreement normally agree to arbitrate
disputes that arise out of that contract." Labor arbitration is, therefore, also
based on private contract, but it is enforced through federal labor laws, not
through the FAA.39 The federal labor laws enable labor and management, as
roughly equal entities, to negotiate the terms of their contractual relationship.
The resulting collective bargaining agreement establishes a self-governing
system4" in which arbitration is the adjudication component.4 The agreement
34. See id. § 3 (providing that court, upon finding that issue is referable to arbitration
under agreement, shall stay trial until after arbitration); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (1996) (noting valid agreement to arbitrate future disputes
effectively ousts court ofjurisdiction).
The Act does not confer subject matter jurisdiction and reaches only disputes that are
within the court's jurisdiction by virtue of some other statute, such as the diversity statute.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983); Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1997).
35. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
36. Id. § 16(a)(1)(A). Congress added this provision in 1988. Judicial Improvement and
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4671 (1988). Pointedly, the statute does
not authorize appeals that would challenge an order that a party must arbitrate.
37. 9 U.S.C. §§ 5-16.
38. See Stone, supra note 6, at 1020 ("[A]rbitration and collective bargaining are usually
assumed to be coterminous, if not synonymous, institutions.").
39. See LaborManagementRelationsAct, 29 U.S.C. §§ 185-188(1994 & Supp. 111996);
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
40. See United Steelworkers ofAm. v. Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,580
(1960) (observing that collective bargaining agreement is effort to erect system of industrial
self-government); see also Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1138
(1977) (noting that arbitration is not substitute for judicial adjudication but is part of system of
industrial self-governance).
41. See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration ofEmploymentDisputes Without Unions, 66 CH.-
KENT L. REV. 753, 759 (1990) [hereinafter Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions] (noting
arbitration in context of collective bargaining is adjudicative institution that parties establish in
lieu of advance agreements to all details of their ongoing relationship).
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to arbitrate, which is given in return for the promise not to strike, is an integral
part of a self-regulating system.42 Playing a central role in the nation's indus-
trial policy, labor arbitration is credited as the mechanism that secures indus-
trial peace.43 For these reasons, the Supreme Court established arbitration as
the favored method for resolving industrial disputes.' Not surprisingly, the
Court's deference to labor arbitration has influenced the Court's endorsement
of commercial arbitration. 5
III. The Supreme Court and the Arbitration of Statutory Claims
Given the general popularity and the Supreme Court's current embrace
of commercial arbitration, it is difficult to imagine a climate in which judges
were skeptical of the forum. Nevertheless, from the FAA's passage in 1925
until the mid-1980s, the federal courts viewed arbitration as an inappropriate
means to decide claims based on federal statutes.
In the 1980s, the Court changed course in three cases known as the
Mitsubishi Trilogy.46 The following discussion traces the Supreme Court
arbitration decisions that deal with statutory claims, ending with a discussion
of the Gilmer decision. The cases concern different statutory claims (securi-
ties laws, antitrust laws, and employment discrimination laws), but the basic
issue is the same - whether the policy choices embodied in federal statutes
42. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,455 (1957) ("Plainly the
agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quidpro quo for an agreement not to strike.").
43. See id. (stating that arbitration is major factor in achieving industrial peace).
44. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)
(requiring court to enforce arbitration agreement); Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
at 582 (deciding to resolve doubts regarding questions of applicability of arbitration agreement
in favor of coverage); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593,596 (1960) (finding arbitrators indispensable part of collective bargaining process because
of their specialized knowledge); see also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 459 (enforcing, pursuant
to § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act, grievance-arbitration provision of collective
bargaining agreement).
45. See BALES, supra note 6, at 19 (noting "profound effect" of Court's strong endorse-
ment of labor arbitration on commercial arbitration); MACNEiL, supra note 15, at 57 (noting that
strong public policy favoring labor arbitration "rubbed off on commercial arbitration"); G.
Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is CommercialArbitra-
tion an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 514 (1990) (noting that
courts deciding ERISA claims in commercial arbitration have followed precedent established
in labor cases).
Decisions based on the FAA have also influenced labor arbitration. See United Paper-
workers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (noting federal courts look to
FAA for guidance in labor arbitration cases).
46. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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require judicial resolution. The cases also share a similar structure: plaintiffs
who had signed arbitration agreements sought to avoid arbitration. Thus, the
ultimate issue in each case was whether the courts should enforce the arbitra-
tion agreement.
A. Public Policy Renders Statutory Claims Inarbitrable
In Wilko v. Swan47 and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,4 the Supreme
Court determined that lower courts should not enforce agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims of securities fraud and employment discrimination.49 In both
decisions, the Court analyzed the particular public policy goals of the statute,
thejudicial role in enforcing those goals, and the more traditional judicial task
of interpreting public law.
1. Commercial Arbitration of Securities Fraud Claims
In Wilko, the Supreme Court held that the Securities Act of 1934 did not
limit an investor who alleged securities fraud to the arbitration forum.5" The
Court determined that the policy objectives of the Securities Act barred
predispute agreements to arbitrate claims of securities fraud.5 The majority
defined the issue as a choice between two competing public policies - to
protect investors or to provide an alternative to litigation.52
Noting that the 1934 Act established rights enforced through civil litiga-
tion,53 the Court contrasted the roles of buyer and seller and found that Section
14 of the 1934 Act barred buyers from waiving their right to ajudicial forum.54
The Court determined that arbitration diminished the effectiveness of the 1934
47. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
48. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
49. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974) (holding that agree-
ment to arbitrate contract claim of racial discrimination did not bar Title VII lawsuit); Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (refusing to enforce arbitration clauses because Congress
intended courts to enforce Securities Act), overruledbyRodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amer-
ican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
50. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35 (finding that Securities Act prohibits investor
from waiving right to judicial forum). The plaintiff in Wilko was a private investor who
alleged that defendants had misrepresented material information concerning an investment.
Id. at 428-29.
51. Id. at 437.
52. See id. at 438 (noting that two policies were "not easily reconcilable").
53. See id. at 431 (noting that Securities Act confers special right of recovery that differs
substantially from common-law actions).
54. See id at 435 (noting that Congress drafted provision to remedy information disad-
vantages under which buyers labor and adopting argument that Congress intended to prevent
sellers from maneuvering buyers into positions that weakened buyers' ability to recover).
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Act's protective provisions.55 The opinion expressed concern that arbitrators,
who had no legal training, would make findings of law interpreting the 1934
Act. 6 Further, the fact that arbitral findings were not generally subject to
judicial review troubled the Court. 7 Following the decision in Wilko, federal
courts expanded its rationale and generally concluded that statutory claims
embodying significant public policy goals were not subject to arbitration.
2. Labor Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,59 the Supreme Court continued to
focus on the public purpose of the particular statute at issue, in this case Title
VII, in determining whether to enforce arbitration agreements? ° The Court
found that Congress intended that courts enforce Title VII.6' The Court
therefore concluded that an employee, whose racial discrimination claim
55. See id at 435-36 (finding arbitration less effective than judicial proceedings in
protecting buyers).
56. See id. (discussing potential danger ofarbitrators incorrectly applying and interpreting
Securities Act).
57. See id at 436 (noting extremely limited grounds on which courts have powerto vacate
award and discussing fact that erroneous interpretations of law by arbitrators are not subject to
review). The Court noted that an arbitrator's manifest disregard of law is reviewable. Id,
58. For example, in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. Maguire, the court relied on
public policy to determine that parties should not arbitrate an antitrust claim. See American
Safety Equip. Corp. v. Maguire, 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968). The court emphasized the
broad public policy of antitrust law to promote the national interest in a competitive economy.
See id. at 826 (stating that "[a] claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter"
because antitrust violations can affect enormous numbers of individuals and inflict staggering
economic damage).
Plaintiffs further this public goal by acting as private attorneys general. Id. The court also
questioned whether arbitrators were qualified to resolve complex antitrust issues. Id. at 827.
Because antitrust law regulates the business community, the court found it less than ideal that
arbitrators from the business community would decide "issues of great public interest." Id. In
light of the pervasive public interest in enforcing antitrust law, the court concluded that
Congress intended courts to resolve antitrust claims. Id. at 827-28.
Succeeding courts relied on American Safety to bar other statutory claims. See Douglas
E. Abrams, Arbitrabiliy in Recent Civil Rights Legislation: The Need for Amendment, 26
CONN. L. Rav. 521, 530-31 (1994) (finding American Safety's influence in cases involving
patent law, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA), and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). Congress has
since authorized arbitration of patent and CEA claims, see Abrams, supra, at 534-37, and the
Supreme Court has ruled that RICO claims are arbitrable. See Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (finding RICO claims arbitrable under Federal
Arbitration Act); infra text accompanying notes 87-96 (discussing McMahon).
59. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
60. See Alexanderv. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,44-45 (1974) (summarizing Title
VII's goals of eliminating and preventing discrimination).
61. See id. (stating that final enforcement authority rested with federal courts).
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under the collective bargaining agreement had been rejected in a labor arbitra-
tion, could pursue a Title VII claim in court. 2 Arbitration of a contractual
right to be free from discrimination does not bar litigation of a similar, statu-
tory right."3 Thus, unionized employees whose contract claims ofdiscrimina-
tion have been denied at arbitration are entitled to a de novo trial of their Title
VII claims in federal courts.'
In resolving the issue, the Court found it dispositive that Congress had
assigned "plenary powers" to enforce the antidiscrimination statute to the
courts.6 Moreover, Congress had assigned a public role to plaintiffs. While
seeking to redress their injuries, plaintiffs "vindicate[ ] the important congres-
sional policy against discriminatory employment practices. '66 The Court
concluded that precluding litigation following arbitration would contravene
Title VII's purpose and procedures.
The Court also relied on judicial authority to decide discrimination
claims and, therefore, declined to formulate a rule under which courts would
defer to prior arbitration of statutory claims.6' Given the purpose and proce-
dures of Title VII, the majority determined that Congress intended federal
courts "to exercise final responsibility" for enforcement of the statute. 9
The Court noted that arbitrators, unlike judges, had no general authority to
62. The employee in Alexander sued his former employer under Title VII. Id. at 43.
Pursuant to a union contract, he previously had arbitrated and lost a raciaf discrimination claim
in an arbitration proceeding at which he alleged unjust discharge. Id. at 38-43. The trial court
dismissed the suit. Id. at 43. The Supreme Court reversed and directed the lower court to hear
the claim de novo. Id. at 60.
63. See id. at 59-60 (approving employee's right to pursue claims both in arbitration and
in court).
64. See id. at 60.
65. See id at 44 (noting final enforcement is vested with federal courts, not EEOC); id.
at 47 (noting that Title VII gives federal courts plenary power to enforce statute); see also id.
at 53 (noting arbitrator, unlike court, has no authority to invoke public laws); id. at 56 (conclud-
ing that "Congress intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of
Title VII").
66. Id at 45.
67. Seeid. at48 (noting Title VII provisions that accord parallel remedies against discrim-
ination and noting that Congress designed Title VII to supplement existing laws relating to dis-
crimination).
The Court also relied on distinctions between collective contract rights and individual
statutory rights. Id. In finding the election of remedies doctrine inapplicable, the Court
emphasized the "distinctly separate nature[s]" of contractual rights conferred by agreement and
statutory rights conferred by Congress. IA at 50. Although a union may waive rights related
to collective activity, it may not waive individual rights. Id. at 51.
68. See id at 60 n.21 (concluding that court may admit arbitral decision as evidence and
providing various factors to determine weight it should accord this evidence).
69. See id. at 56. The Court noted that deferral necessarily assumes that arbitral processes
are commensurate with judicial processes. Id.
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invoke laws that conflict with the labor contract." Indeed, an arbitrator's
authority rests on knowledge of the "law of the shop, not the law of the
land."'" Thus, the Court found judicial authority in the traditional role of the
federal courts to interpret federal law, and the Court evinced concern that
arbitrators might rely on standards other than those of public law to resolve
Title VII claims."2
In later cases, the Court relied upon the decision and reasoning of
Gardner-Denver to hold that courts need not enforce agreements to arbitrate
in claims involving Section 1983 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. 3 In each
70. See id. at 53 (discussing arbitrator's inability to draw from law outside of agreement).
71. See id. at 57 (identifying contract as source of labor arbitrator's authority). Arbitra-
tors' specialized competence does not include knowledge of public law, which is necessary to
interpret the broad language of Title VII. Id.
The Court also explained that arbitral procedures, while well-suited to contract disputes,
make the forum inappropriate for the final resolution of Title VII claims. See id. at 56-57
(citing informality of arbitration, lack of legal expertise, and absence of explanatory awards).
72. Gardner-Denver, at least for the time being, survives as good law. Relying on the
Court's commercial arbitration cases and especially Gilmer, see infra subparts III.C and III.D,
the Fourth Circuit ruled that labor arbitrators should hear the employment discrimination claim
of a unionized employee, see Wrightv. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., No. 96-2850,1997 WL
422869, at *2 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997) (unpublished disposition) (relying on Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996)), vacated and remanded, 119
S. Ct. 391(1998). The Supreme Court granted certiorari but declined to decide the ultimate
issue, whether an employee whose collective bargaining agreement contains an antidiscrim-
ination clause as broad as the statutory right must arbitrate that claim. See Wright v. Universal
Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391,397 (1998) (finding collective bargaining agreement did
"not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of employee's rights to judicial forum for federal
claims of employment discrimination").
The Wright decision reaffirms the reasoning of Gardner-Denver, notably its distinction
between contract rights and statutory rights. See id. at 396 (noting that plaintiffs cause of
action "is distinct from any right conferred by the collective bargaining agreement" and that
"ultimate question ... is not what parties agreed to, but what federal law requires"). Given
Gardner-Denver's emphasis on the importance of afederal judicial forum, the Court stated that
any prospective waiver must be "clear and unmistakable." See id. (explaining its reluctance to
infer mandatory arbitration without clear waiver).
Thus, there is "obviously some tension" between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer that awaits
resolution. See id. at 395 (noting Gardner-Denver stated that Title VII rights are not susceptible
of prospective waiver but that Gilmer held that employee could waive right to federal judicial
forum under ADEA). This discrepancy and the interplay between labor arbitration and the FAA
and between collective and individual rights requires more thorough treatment than the scope
of this Article permits. Nevertheless, the conclusions reached here regarding the role of public
policy in the arbitration of employment discrimination claims in commercial arbitration bear
directly on arbitration of discrimination claims in the unionized workplace.
73. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284,292 (1984) (stating that federal
court should not give res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to arbitration award under
collective bargaining agreement that involved § 1983 claims); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (concluding that employee alleging violation of
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case, the Court emphasized that arbitrators had no authority to interpret public
law, by virtue of either the contract or the statute.74 As in Gardner-Denver,
the Court found judicial authority in the role Congress assigned to the courts
under the statutes and in the traditional judicial function of interpreting public
law.
Wilko, Gardner-Denver, and their progeny rejected the arbitration of
statutory claims in the interest of the public policy objectives of the statutes
at issue. Courts reasoned that meeting those objectives required judicial
enforcement because Congress had so intended and because arbitrators were
not prepared, either through experience or training, to interpret and apply
public law. The decisions, however, did not analyze or explain how judicial
resolution advanced public policy.7' This omission left the holdings vulnera-
ble to reinterpretation, and in the cases that followed, the Court moved away
from analyzing public policy objectives.
B. The Court Reconsiders the Role of Public Policy
During the 1980s, two broad issues regarding commercial arbitration
reached the Supreme Court. In the first series of cases, the Court developed
a uniform federal law of arbitration by examining the interplay between the
FAA, state courts, and state law.76 These decisions reflected a new respect for
the arbitration forum. In a second set of cases known as the Mitsubishi
Fair Labor Standards Act may sue in federal district court following arbitration under collective
bargaining agreement).
74. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-91 (discussing arbitrator's inability to enforce FLSA
and to draw from extra-contractual sources in fashioning relief); Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743-45
(same).
75. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 94 (noting failure of courts to "weave... coherent
rationale for denying enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses").
76. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,492 (1987) (holding FAA preempted California
labor law that limited arbitration); Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 213 (1985)
(requiring courts to sever arbitrable state law claims and to submit them to arbitration);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984) (finding thatFAA, notstate law, governs
state court decision to enforce arbitration); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (concludingthat when deciding enforceability ofarbitration clause
under FAA under multifactor analysis, federal courts may refuse to defer to action pending in
state court). This line of cases began with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufactur-
ing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967), which held that federal courts must apply federal arbitration
law in diversity cases. See generally MACNEIL, supra note 15; Linda R. Hirshman, The Second
Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization ofArbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985).
Recently, the Court has expanded on its preemption decisions. See Doctor's Assocs. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (holding that states may not target arbitration provisions
to void state requirement that arbitration provision must appear in capital letters on front page
ofagreement); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,268 (1995) (holding FAA
applies to any "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" (quoting FAA § 2)).
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Trilogy, the Court modified its analysis of the issue and, influenced by its
more receptive view of arbitration, reversed its position against arbitration of
statutory claims. The following discussion reviews those cases.
1. Antitrust Claims
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,' an auto-
mobile dealer wanted to litigate, rather than arbitrate, an antitrust claim." The
Court decided that the dealer had to arbitrate the claim because the arbitration
agreement was part of an international transaction.79 The Court's holding,
expressly based on the international context of the commercial contract, 0 can
be viewed as an exception to the Court's previous holdings that statutory
claims are subject to litigation.
To buttress its decision, the Court soundly critiqued the view that arbitra-
tion was an inappropriate forum in which to hear antitrust claims.8" More
significantly, the Court did not find that the public policy underlying antitrust
law and its role in regulating democratic capitalism required litigation.82 To
77. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
78. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 621
(1985) (describing First Circuit's rejection of dealer's contention that claim was not arbitrable).
Seeking to reship vehicles from Puerto Rico to the United States and Latin America, the dealer
argued that defendant's refusal to allow shipment restrained competition in violation of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 620.
79. See id. at 629.
80. See id. (concluding "that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities
of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need ofthe international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require [enforcement]"); id. at 636 (stating
that international context may "add an element of uncertainty to dispute resolution," therefore
prospective litigant may agree in advance to recover antitrust damages through arbitration). The
Court also analogized the arbitration agreement to forum selection clauses in international
transactions. Id. at 629.
A previous decision had created an international exception to the Wilko standard. See
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-17 (1974) (enforcing arbitration to decide
disputes under 1934 Securities Act because of international implications of the case).
81. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633 (noting that courts enforce postdispute arbitration
agreements and that "adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration"). The
majority discounted the argument that antitrust claims were too complex for untrained arbitra-
tors to decide. Id. The Court found the argument that contracts of adhesion presented a viable
threat to public policy unconvincing. Id at 632 (noting that party could show that agreement
was "affected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power;" that "enforcement
would be unreasonable and unjust;" or that proceedings would deprive party of day in court
(internal quotations omitted)). The Court also rejected the possibility that an arbitration panel
chosen from the commercial world would be innately hostile to the constraints on business
imposed by antitrust law. Id.
82. See id. at 637 (concluding that use of arbitration did not affect goals of antitrust law).
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reach this conclusion, the Court limited its examination of the purpose of
antitrust law to the damages provision of the statute.83 In view of Congress's
authorization of treble damages, the Court conceded that the private cause of
action played a central role in enforcing the law by deterring potential viola-
tors. 4 Nevertheless, the Court found that the main purpose of the treble
damages provision was to provide a remedy for economic injuries." The
majority then stated that arbitration met this public goal if plaintiffs could
effectively "vindicate [their] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum."86
The Mitsubishi critique of the Court's prior cases profoundly affected the
analysis and outcome of future cases. In Mitsubishi, the Court chose to focus
on the purpose of the remedial provision of the statute and to forego an
analysis of the broader goals of the law. The decision effectively modified the
inquiry from considering public policy to considering the fairness of the
arbitration forum in effecting remediation of the statutory injury. In two
succeeding cases, the Court applied the new analysis and enforced agreements
to arbitrate statutory claims.
2. Securities and Racketeering Claims
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,7 the Court faced a
claim reminiscent of that in Wilko.88 The plaintiff-investors argued that the
public policy underlying the Securities Act of 1934 barred enforcement of
their arbitration agreement.89 The Court disagreed and required arbitration of
83. See id. at 635-38.
84. See id. at 636 (acknowledging role of individual litigant as private attorney general
to protect public interest).
85. See id. at635-36 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
485-86 (1977)). The Court did not consider the options for enforcement that Congress had
rejected, which ranged from barring offenders from use of the courts or the postal service to
forfeiture, limiting transportation of goods, reducing tariff protection, increased taxes, and
simple publicity. Congress copied the treble damages provision from a British law, the Statute
of Monopolies. See ROGER SHERMAN, ANTrrRusT POLIcIES AND ISSUES 50 (1978) (noting
treble damages provision "has not been entirely successful as a remedy").
86. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,637 (1985).
The Court noted that individuals may decide whether to bring or to settle a suit, further
diminishing the public policy aspect of the private cause of action. See id. at 636 (stating that
no individual is under obligation to bring suit).
87. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
88. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); supra note
50 (describing plaintiff's Securities Act claim in Wilko).
89. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (summarizing plaintiff's argument that Congress
intended court to hear claims under Securities Act). The plaintiffs alleged "fraudulent, exces-
sive trading" of their accounts, false statements, and failure to disclose material information.
Id. at 223.
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claims brought under the 1934 Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Practices Act (RICO).9'
The plaintiffs contended that the treble damages available through
RICO's civil remedies provision indicated Congress's intent that thejudiciary
enforce RICO.91 In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the Court relied on Mitsu-
bishi's emphasis on "the priority of the compensatory function" of treble
damages over any "deterrent function."' Reasoning that the treble damages
provisions in RICO were analogous to those of the antitrust law considered in
Mitsubishi, the Court reiterated its belief that, so long as litigants could
vindicate their statutory rights effectively, arbitration achieved the goals of
remediation and deterrence.93
In arguing against the arbitration of their securities fraud claims, the
plaintiffs relied on Wilko's holding that Congress intended ajudicial forum for
the resolution of investor disputes. 94 The Court, however, elected not to apply
Wilko's methodology of analyzing the statute at issue. Instead, over a dissent-
ing view on this point,95 the Court characterized the Wilko decision as driven
by outdated hostility to arbitration and ruled that the claim was subject to
arbitration.96 This holding produced an anomaly in securities law. Plaintiffs
could not arbitrate claims arising from the 1934 Act under Wilko, while they
90. See id. at 238 (finding no congressional intent to preclude SEC or RICO claims from
arbitration). RICO is primarily a criminal statute aimed at organized criminal organizations that
infiltrate legitimate business enterprises. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994). Section 1964(c) author-
izes "any person injured" by a violation of the Actto maintain a civil cause of action. See, e.g.,
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 492 U.S. 229,233 (1989) (stating that person found liable
in private civil action must pay treble damages); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
495 (1985) (stating that § 1964(c) permits private suit by anyone injured under Act). The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 excepts actions in securities fraud from the
provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
91. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 240 (describing plaintiff's contention that arbitrating
RICO claim eligible for treble damages contradicted public policy).
92. See id. at 239 (finding no irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and underlying
purposes of civil RICO).
93. See id at 240 (likening reasons for allowing arbitration of RICO claims to those
supporting arbitration of securities fraud claims). The Court surveyed the legislative history
of RICO and found that Congress's primary purpose in authorizing civil suits was to provide
remedial relief to those injured by racketeering activity. Id. at 242. The decision regarding
RICO did not draw a dissent.
94. See id. at 228 (describing plaintiffs as seeking same interpretation of § 29(a) of 1934
Act as Wilko Court had accorded to § 14 in 1933 Act).
95. See id. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (complaining that majority misconstrued
Wilko in that Wilko turned on Securities Act's text and legislative history, rather than on general
problems with arbitration).
96. See id at 233 (rejecting Wilko Court's view that arbitration weakened plaintiff's
ability to recover). The Court also relied on the Securities and Exchange Commission's
oversight authority over securities arbitration. Id.
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could arbitrate those arising from the Securities Act of 1933 under McMahon.
Two years later, in Rodriguez de Quyas v. ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc.,"7
the Court eliminated this inconsistency by formally overturning Wilko.98 The
Rodriguez majority affirmed the Court's confidence in arbitration and again
characterized the Wilko decision as pervaded by "the old judicial hostility to
arbitration.""
In McMahon and Rodriguez, the Court departed from the Wilko standard,
which effectively required proponents of arbitration to demonstrate that the
FAA displaced judicial power authorized by statute. Under the Court's new
analysis, opponents of arbitration must demonstrate that the relevant statute
bars arbitration."° The Mitsubishi Trilogy thus limited consideration of the
public policy goal of the statutes to remediation and deterrence, changed the
focus of the analysis to the fairness of the arbitration forum, and realigned the
parties' burdens in litigating the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Two
years later, the Court applied this analytic framework to a claim of workplace
discrimination brought under the federal law banning age discrimination in
employment.
C. Gilmer and the Arbitration of Workplace Discrimination Claims
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,'0 the Court held that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not bar binding arbitra-
tion."0 2 At the outset, the majority signaled that it would rely on its recent
97. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
98. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (stating it is "undesirable for the decisions... to continue to exist side by side" because
inconsistency undermines essential rationale for harmonious construction ofthese two statutes).
99. See id. at 480-81 (stating that to extent Wilko rested on suspicion that arbitration
weakened protections afforded by substantive law, "it has fallen far out of step with our current
strong endorsement of arbitration" (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942))). Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun. See id at486 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that none of majority's
arguments merited overturning settled interpretation of statute).
100. See id. at 483 (indicating that those opposed to arbitration have burden of show-
ing arbitration agreements are not enforceable under relevant Act); see also Shearson/Amer-
ican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987) (observing under 9 U.S.C. § 2,
party opposing arbitration must show Congress intended to preclude waiver ofjudicial reme-
dies).
101. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
102. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-33 (1991) (reasoning
that because ADEA does not preclude arbitration and FAA policy favors arbitration, ADEA
claim may be subjected to compulsory arbitration). Gilmer, the former manager of financial
services at Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, sought to avoid arbitration of an age discrimi-
nation claim against his employer. Id. at 23. The trial court ruled that litigation could proceed,
reasoning that the legislature intended to protect ADEA claimants from waiving judicial
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commercial arbitration cases, rather than on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co."3 The opinion distinguished Gardner-Denver and its progeny.' Signifi-
cantly, in Gardner-Denver, unions represented claimants in litigation, so the
aggrieved employees did not control the suit.05 Also, Gardner-Denver raised
a different issue: whether arbitration of a statutory claim precluded subse-
quent judicial resolution."° Finally, Gardner-Denver and its progeny were
not decided under the FAA, which favors arbitration."7
Given the national policy favoring arbitration, Gilmer had to prove that
Congress did not intend the ADEA to allow employees to waive their right to
ajudicial forum. '8 Gilmer sought to meet this burden by adopting the criteria
of the Gardner-Denver Court - the public policy goal of the statute and
judicial authority to effect that policy.0 9 Gilmer argued that arbitration was
inconsistent with the statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA." ° The
majority agreed that Congress designed the ADEA to further important social
policies, but found no inconsistency between those policies and enforcing
agreements to arbitrate."' Indeed, according to the majority, both arbitration
and judicial resolution advance the broader social purpose of the ADEA."
proceedings. let at 23-24. The court of appeals reversed, finding no evidence of congressional
intent to preclude arbitration. Id. at 24.
As an employee in the securities industry, Gilmer had to register with the New York Stock
Exchange as a condition of employment. Id. at 23. The registration application included an
agreement to arbitrate "any dispute, claim or controversy" between him and his employer that
his employer's "rules, constitutions, or by-laws" required to be arbitrated. Id at 24-25.
103. 415 U.S. 36(1974). The Gilmer Court observed that the FAA "manifest[s] a'liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."' See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). The Court stated that
recent decisions reflected the liberal federal policy. Id. at 26 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
104. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35 (distinguishing Gardner-Denver because it involved
arbitration of contract-based claims rather than statutory claims).
105. See id at35 (noting tension between collective representation and individual statutory
rights).
106. See id
107. See id. at 36.
108. See Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (1991) (noting Gilmer's
burden and observing that congressional intent can be determined from text of statute, its
legislative history, or inherent conflict between arbitration and ADEA's underlying purposes).
109. See id. at 27.
110. See id. at 27-29.
111. See id at 28.
112. See id. at 28-29 (relying on examples of statutory claims under Sherman Act,
Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, and RICO).
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Reasoning again from Gardner-Denver, Gilmer next argued that Con-
gress intended that the judiciary enforce the statute.'1 " The Court responded
that Congress had authorized a flexible approach, including arbitration, to
resolve age discrimination claims."" Declining to discuss the public policy
arguments further, the Court stated that the touchstone of its inquiry was
whether individuals may effectively vindicate claims in the arbitral forum." 5
Turning to the arguments that arbitration procedures rendered arbitration
an inadequate forum in which to pursue an age discrimination claim, the Court
disposed of each critique. The majority stated that in the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) arbitration forum, individuals could effectively vindicate
their claims." 6 According to the majority, applicable NYSE arbitration rules
regarding the selection of arbitrators adequately protect employees." 7 Addi-
tionally, the limited discovery available in arbitration was not inconsistent
with the ADEA."8 The majority also was not convinced that the absence of
written opinions would result "in lack of public knowledge of employers'
discriminatory policies, an inability to obtain effective appellate review, and
a stifling of the development of the law."" 9 Noting that the NYSE requires
written awards, the Court predicted thatjudicial decisions addressing ADEA
claims would not end and observed that the argument applied equally to
settlement, which the ADEA allows. 20 Regarding the "necessarily" limited
judicial review, the Court found it sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply
with the requirements of the statute.' 2 1 The majority was not troubled that
arbitrators cannot order broad equitable relief or deal with class actions."
113. See icl at 29 (arguing that arbitration deprives injured employees of judicial forum
provided by ADEA).
114. See i& (observing thatEEOC is directed to pursue "informal methods of conciliation,
conference, and persuasion" and that "arbitration is consistent with Congress's grant of
concurrent jurisdiction over ADEA claims to state and federal courts").
115. See id. at 28 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). The Court also did not think that arbitration would undermine the
enforcement role of the EEOC, because the EEOC has independent authority to investigate age
discrimination. Id. at 29.
116. See id. at 30 (stating that generalized attacks on arbitration are "far out of step with
our current strong endorsement" of FAA (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,481 (1989))).
117. See id.
118. See id at 31. Conceding that arbitration limits discovery, the Court considered
limitation on discovery a fair exchange for the benefits of arbitration.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 32.
121. See id. at 32 n.4 (citing McMahon).
122. See id. at 32 (observing that fact that arbitration may not go forward as class action
did not argue against individual arbitration and stating that "arbitration agreements will not
preclude EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief").
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Noting that contract law provided sufficient protection for the parties, the
Court also refused to entertain the argument that the agreements should not be
enforced because they were coercive and the product of unequal bargaining
power.
12
D. The Assumption in Gilmer
The Court did not entirely abandon a public policy analysis in the Mitsu-
bishi Trilogy and did not do so in Gilmer. It did, however, redefine the policy.
In Mitsubishi, the Court shifted the inquiry regarding arbitration from the
broad policy goals of the statute to a more narrow goal - to provide a remedy
to individuals injured by a statutory violation. The Court followed the same
course in Gilmer. It did not examine the overall purpose of the ADEA to
determine if arbitration could effect that purpose. Instead, the Court evaluated
whether individual plaintiffs could secure redress in the arbitration forum. 24
The Court thus subsumed the statute's broader goal, ending workplace age
discrimination, into the more limited goal of ensuring that individuals obtain
a remedy for a discrimination injury, thus crediting only one public policy.
The Court's reasoning also allowed it to treat all statutory claims as if
they were the same." Because the Gilmer Court did not distinguish among
the statutory claims, the Court was able to rely on prior holdings, making it
unnecessary to inquire whether the nature of the claim distinguished Gilmer
from the commercial cases of the Mitsubishi Trilogy. 26 In declining to fully
The dissentregarded the exclusion ofclasswide injunctive reliefin arbitration proceedings
as determinative. Because the discrimination statutes authorize courts to award broad, class-
based injunctive relief to achieve their purposes, the absence of such relief in arbitration
frustrates an "essential purpose" of the ADEA. See i. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
also that majority decision "made the foxes the guardians of the chickens" (quoting Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))).
123. See id. at 33 ("Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient
reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable....").
124. The outcome ofthe inquiry turned on whether arbitration provides an adequate forum
in which to hear employment discrimination claims. See generally James Rytting, Arbitrating
Discrimination: How the Concept of Individual Rights Undermines the Procedural and Sub-
stantive Protections of Title VII (Apr. 28, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author) (explaining effect of Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Gilmer).
125. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (analogizing
ADEA policy to policies of antitrust law, securities law, and civil racketeering).
126. The claims in the Mitsubishi Trilogy shared a common ground: all of the plaintiffs
alleged injury to economic interests sustained by violations of laws aimed at regulating business
dealings. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478-79
(1989) (describing circumstances giving rise to suit); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222-25 (1987) (same); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616-20 (1985) (same). The disputes grew out of commercial
contracts and the alleged injury was commensurate with the damages requested. The injury in
Gilmer, while redressed by a monetary award, rests in rights to personal dignity. See Ann C.
418
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engage the arguments, however, the Gilmer opinion remains unsatisfactory
and, ultimately, unconvincing.' 2
Given Gilmer's emphasis on arbitration procedure, commentary on the
case tends to center on whether arbitration can vindicate the claims of individ-
ual employees. These commentaries reveal significant doubt, shared by this
author, that arbitration generally provides a fair forum for employees. 28 On
the other hand, it should be noted that the procedural characteristics ofarbitra-
tion which impair plaintiffs' suits may also result in unjustified awards against
defendant-employers.' 29
The following analysis does not repeat the critiques of Gilmer that are
based on the substantive and procedural rights of employees, but takes a
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent Discharge
Policy, 57 OnIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1450-52 (1996) [hereinafter McGinley, Rethinking CivilRights]
(noting that injuries are based on rights to employment and personal dignity and law should deal
separately with loss of property right and loss of dignity); Shell, supra note 45, at 570 ("Title
VII claims deal with rights to personal dignity and equal protection, not economic rights such
as those embodied in securities laws [and] RICO .... ).
127. Scholars have noted the dismissive, conclusory tone of the opinion. See Thomas E.
Carbonneau, The Demise ofDue Process in American Law, 70 TuL. L. REv. 1945, 1958 (1996)
(stating that "quality of the Court's reasoning in these cases detracts from the credibility of the
announced doctrine"); Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer? - Some
Ruminations on the Arbitration ofDiscrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. Rnv. 203,
204 (1992) [hereinafter Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?] (criticizing opinion for its
"unsatisfying superficiality"); Grodin, supra note 4, at 12 (noting Court dismissed arguments
in manner that reflected certain impatience); McGinley, Rethinking CivilRights, supra note 126,
at 1475-76 (characterizing Court's approach as "cavalier"); Sternlight, supra note 7, at 674
(characterizing Court's interpretation of FAA as based on assertion rather than reason).
128. See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 127, at 1957-60 (critiquing Court's choice of
arbitration overjudicial resolution of claims); Cole, supra note 9, at 474-79 (concluding that,
for both procedural and substantive reasons, arbitration favors employer); Martin H. Malin,
Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath ofGilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77,
95-99 (1996) (noting FAA has limited value in policing procedural fairness of statutory
employment discrimination claims); McGinley, Rethinking CivilRights, supranote 126, at 1476
(noting problems faced by plaintiffs in securities arbitration); Shell, supra note 45, at 572-73
(concluding that arbitration is inappropriate forum in which to decide discrimination claims);
Stemlight supra note 7, at 679-80 (describing that binding arbitration produces distributional
inequity and injustice and that procedural rules influence substantive rights); Stone, supra note
6, at 1036-43 (noting due process deficiencies of arbitration agreements and arbitration
procedures); Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims
with Special Reference to the Three A's -Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE
FORESTL. REv. 231, 289 (1996) (concluding that adjudicative procedures of arbitration favor
employer); see also supra note 9 (summarizing arguments against arbitrating employment
discrimination claims based on informality of arbitration, institutionalized incentives of
arbitrators, and demographic traits of arbitrators).
129. See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1351 (1997) [hereinafter Estreicher, Predispute Agreements]
("The limitations of arbitration are reciprocal .. ").
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different course. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether the Court was
correct in assuming that the statute "will continue to serve both its remedial
and deterrent function" as long as prospective litigants may "effectively
vindicate" their claims in arbitration. '30 First, the assumption limits the means
of achieving the goal of eliminating discrimination in employment to deter-
rence. Second, the Gilmer majority believed employment discrimination can
be deterred as long as the individual has a fair opportunity to obtain redress.
The following discussion examines whetherthe vindication of individual
rights in arbitration generally furthers the public goal of employment discrimi-
nation law, as the Court believes. In a sense, the analysis of public policy
begins where the pre-Mitsubishi Trilogy cases left off. Those cases, although
based on considerations of public policy, did not explicitly examine whether
and how litigation effects the public purpose of the statutes under consider-
ation. The following analysis considers the relationship between the policy
goals of employment discrimination statutes and the method of enforcing
those goals.
IV Public Policy and the Private Cause ofAction
Federal employment discrimination law is a network of statutes, each
enacted as part of a broad congressional effort to protect employees from
discrimination in the workplace."' The laws make it illegal for an employer
to discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion;'
age; and disabilities.'34 Title VII, passed in 1964 as part of landmark civil
rights legislation,'35 is the centerpiece of this web. 36 The statutes that fol-
130. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at28 (quotingMitsubishi Motors Corp. v. SolerChrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
131. SeeMcKennon v.NashvilleBannerPubl'g Co., 513 U.S. 352,357(1995) (describing
ADEA as part of "ongoing congressional effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace").
132. See Equal Pay Act of 1963,29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994); Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-7 (1994 & Supp. 111996) [hereinafter Title VII].
133. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994
& Supp. 111996).
134. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 &
Supp. I 1996). Earlier legislation protects employees from discrimination on the basis of union
activities. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994) (listing unfair labor
practices).
135. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-7 (1994 & Supp. I 1996)).
136. Title VII defines employment discrimination as follows:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
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lowed, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), were modeled after Title VII, share its
purpose and structure, and are interpreted consistently with Title VII. 37
Consequently, for purposes of analyzing the statutes, the following discussion
focuses on Title VII and notes distinctions from the other statutes when
appropriate.
The discussion reviews the public policy embodied in Title VII and
examines the role of the private cause of action in achieving that policy. In
order to determine whether arbitration is an appropriate forum in which to
achieve the public policy goals of employment discrimination law, the analy-
sis compares the effectiveness of litigation and arbitration. This discussion
also reveals that the interest of the employee and the public are not necessarily
congruent.
A. The Public Goal of Employment Discrimination Laws
The broad purpose of Title VII is to "eliminat[e] discrimination in the
workplace." "' Title VII also seeks to make persons whole for injuries result-
ing from discriminatory treatment.' Thus the purpose of Title VII is two-
fold: the statute seeks to achieve a public purpose, ending workplace discrim-
ination, and to remedy individual injuries of discrimination. 4 0 The employee
who has suffered discrimination hopes to resolve a specific problem, while the
public policy goal is to solve the general problem of discrimination. 4' Al-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
137. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352,357 (1995); Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 n.12 (1978) (noting that substantive provisions of ADEA were
derived in haec verba from Title VII).
138. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358 (quoting OscarMayer& Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,
756 (1979)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (stating that mandate
of Title VII is absolute stricture "that each employee be free from discriminatory practices").
139. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (describing purpose
of Title VII).
140. See id. at 417 (stating primary purpose of Title VII is"prophylactic"). The term "pro-
phylactic" encompasses both preventing discrimination and remedying discrimination. See
WEBsTER'sNEwUNIVERSALUNABRIUGEDDICTIONARY 1443 (2d ed. 1983) (defining "prophy-
lactic" as adjective meaning "to prevent" and as noun meaning "remedy ... that prevents
disease").
141. See Shell, supra note 45, at 568 (noting adjudication of Title VII claims provides
opportunity to reverse instance of discrimination and to examine discriminating institution);
Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 483 n.1 (1987) (noting distinction between "dis-
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though the two goals are closely related, it is useful for purposes of analysis
to consider each goal separately. The achievement of the public goal depends
upon the success of individuals in redressing their injury. And the individ-
ual's interest in remediation gains legitimacy and support from the public
policy goals of the statutes. In the following discussion, the term "public
goal" or "public interest" refers to the broad policy objective of ending dis-
crimination; the term "individual goal" or "individual interest" indicates an
injured plaintiff's interest in remediation.
The public shares the interest of individuals in fair, equal treatment in the
workplace. 2 Ending workplace discrimination confirms a defining value of
the Constitution and American society.'43 The landmark 1964 civil rights
legislation is based on the proposition that people are "created equal.""'
Workplace discrimination breaches that ideal, a cornerstone of the American
moral and legal system. 45 Conversely, ending workplace discrimination
reinforces that value. As President Kennedy noted, ending discrimination in
America confronts us "with a moral issue."
146
In addition, the public and the individual continue to share a more
pragmatic, instrumental interest in ending one form of workplace discrimina-
tion: racial tension. Congress enacted Title VII during the turmoil of racial
violence 147 in recognition that legislation was necessary to reduce racial
pute," an identifiable controversy between identifiable parties, and "problem," which is more
pervasive and elusive).
142. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) ("The
broad, overriding societal interest 'shared by employer, employee, and consumer... is efficient
and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and ... neutral employment and personnel
decisions." (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973))).
143. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to Search, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2084-89 (1992)
(noting philosophical theories that support regulation of private conduct).
144. John F. Kennedy eloquently expressed this concept:
It ought to be possible, in short, for every American to enjoy the privileges of being
American without regard to his race or his color. In short, every American ought
to have the right to be treated as he would wish to be treated, as one would wish his
children to be treated.
John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June
11, 1963), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNiTED STATES, JOHN F. KENNEDY
1963, at 18 (1964).
145. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A TortActionfor Racial Insults, Epithets,
andName Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.REv. 133,136-41 (1982) (statingthatracia discrimi-
nation harms society as whole because it contradicts egalitarian ideal embodied in Civil War
amendments, demoralizes those who prefer to live in equal society and makes them unwilling
participants in perpetuation of racial inequality, and contributes to class system).
146. See Kennedy, supra note 144, at 18.
147. See-David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The
Events Leading to the Introduction of the CivilRightsAct of.1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645,670-
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hostility."' Despite the progress that has been made since 1964, the goal of
reducing racial tension remains important.149  Finally, Congress saw the
legislation as a way to remove barriers to economic growth; all of the employ-
ment discrimination statutes serve this interest.1 5' Legislators agreed that
discrimination, which excludes individuals from the workforce for reasons
unrelated to their productivity, harms the economy and imposes significant
economic costs on the nation.' 5' Racial and other discriminatory barriers
prevent some individuals from pursuing jobs in which they can be the most
productive, and a failure to assign workers to jobs in an effective way can
impair economic growth. By providing equal opportunity, workplace discrim-
72 (1995) (recounting change in public consciousness stemming from Birmingham protests that
made legislation possible). On May 2, 1963, Birmingham police broke up a civil rights march
led by Martin Luther King, Jr. with billy clubs, police dogs, and fire hoses, a news event that
made headlines and was widely televised. Shortly thereafter on June 11, 1993, President
Kennedy appeared on television to explain that civil rights legislation was necessary. On June
19, 1963, he submitted the legislation to Congress. Id at 671; Silver, supra note 141, at 485.
148. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393
[hereinafter 1964 House Report] (noting slow progress of voluntary action and "growing
impatience by the victims of discrimination"); Kennedy, supra note 144 (stating that "[u]nless
the Congress acts, the[ ] only remedy [of African American citizens] is in the street").
149. See John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment
Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1607 (1992) (finding value in workplace discrimi-
nation laws because conscientious efforts to eradicate private discrimination limit likelihood of
racial antagonism).
150. ICHAELJ.ZIMERETAL., CASESANDMATERALS ONEMPLOYMENTDISCRMnhATION
36 n.* (3d ed. 1994) (noting focus of Title VII was "unabashedly economic"). Congress hoped
Title VII would facilitate full economic participation by African Americans. See id (noting
protection of national origin and sex similarly rest on solid economic basis); see also Minna J.
Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VIIBack Pay Remedy, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1303 (1990) (noting belief that achieving economic parity for minorities
and increased productivity for nation was either "hopeful" or "naive").
151. See 110 CONG.REC. 13,088 (1964) (statement ofSen. Humphrey) ("There is consider-
able evidence to demonstrate that permitting people to be hired on the basis of their qualifica-
tions not only helps business, but also improves the total national economy."); see also 1964
House Report, supra note 148, at 2515 (statement of Rep. McColloch) ("The failure of our
society to extend job opportunities to the Negro is an economic waste .... This... acts as a
brake upon potential increases in gross national product.").
Without any increase in unemployment, there is a loss because workers are not employed
in the most productive way. To the extent that discrimination causes increased unemployment,
welfare costs increase. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DIS-
CRIMINATIONINEMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARYOF LABORTOTHE CONGRESS UNDER
SECTION715 OFTHECIVILRIGHTSACTOF 1964, at 18 (1965), reprintedin U.S. EQUALEMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVEHISTORYOFTHEAGEDISCRIMINATIONINEMPLOY-
MENTACT 16,35 (198 1) (finding that arbitrary age discrimination harms U.S. economy because
it deprives nation of productive workers and results in increased unemployment and social
security costs).
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 395 (1999)
ination laws encourage individuals to develop their talents and skills and to
reach their full potential. When discriminatory barriers do not encumber job
assignments and all workers are free to engage in their most productive
activities, the same number of people can produce more goods and services.
The entire community thus benefits from the removal of constraints on job
assignments.
5 2
B. The Private Cause ofAction
To implement these ambitious public policy objectives, Congress vested
the power to enforce the protections of Title VII in private individuals and the
courts.' Lawsuits brought by individuals are the primary enforcement tool
of workplace discrimination statutes.
1. The Enforcement System
Congress chose to vest enforcement of the statute in individuals by
authorizing them to bring private suits against employers." The legislation
enacted in 1964 limited the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to investigating complaints of discrimination and to
resolving them by "conference, conciliation, and persuasion."'55 It was not
until 1972, when Congress recognized the ineffectiveness of the EEOC's
conciliation efforts, that Congress authorized the EEOC to sue employers.1
56
152. William H. Hutt has shown that discriminatory employment practices have negative
effects on economic efficiency. See WILULAM H. HuTT, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COLOUR BAR
56-57, 82-86 (1964) (analyzing South African economy).
Although progress has been uneven, there are positive trends in the economic conditions
of people of color and women that are linked to antidiscrimination legislation. See John J.
Donohue UI & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEo. L.J.
1713, 1718-20 (1991).
153. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,44 (1974) ("The [EEOC] cannot
adjudicate claims or impose administrative sanctions. Rather, final responsibility for enforce-
ment of Title VII is vested with federal courts.").
154. Congress considered and rejected a public enforcement scheme modeled after the
National Labor Relations Board. See Kotkin, supra note 150, at 1315-18 (noting role ofNLRB
isto enforce public, ratherthan private, rights). Under this plan, the EEOC would have received
complaints and prosecuted and decided them, with appeal to the federal courts. Idt at 1315.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982). The original statute vested enforcement authority
in individuals; the Attorney General, who was authorized to bring cases of national import; and
the EEOC's conciliation efforts. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241, 259 (1964).
156. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-6(c)-(e) (1972)). The amendment authorized the
EEOC to file lawsuits and also transferred to the EEOC the Attorney General's enforcement
authority in cases that do not involve government employees.
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Individuals may not sue their employers for workplace discrimination
without first filing an initial complaint with the EEOC. 7 The agency then
investigates the charges and, depending on the evidence of discrimination,
either dismisses the claim or attempts to settle it through conciliation. When
attempts at settlement fail, the agency may sue the employer. If the EEOC
decides not to pursue the case, it issues a right to sue letter to the complaining
employee.' Only then may the employee take the matter to court. Con-
gress's confidence in the capacity of the individual lawsuit to enforce Title
VII is reflected in the fact that the employee may file suit even when the
agency investigation does not find evidence of discrimination.'59
The EEOC takes only a small fraction of cases it has investigated to
court."6 Faced with an increasing number of claims and a rising backlog and
budgetary shortfalls, the agency has resorted to a priority system under which
it will sue only in certain circumstances.16' Moreover, because of the decline
in the number of class actions and disparate impact claims, individual claims
of disparate treatment dominate employment discrimination actions.'62
2. The Individual Litigant as a Private Attorney General
In pursuing their rights under the employment discrimination statutes,
individual claimants serve two masters. First, individual claimants represent
their own interests in obtaining redress for injuries resulting from discrimina-
tion. Second, they also act for the greater public. Congress recognized that
individuals represent the public when it authorized courts to award attorney's
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(b). The ADEA and the ADA use the same procedure. See 29
U.S.C. § 626 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994).
158. The EEOC must issue the letter if it fails to file suit within 180 days after the charge
is filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC may decide not to file suit
because it did not find reasonable cause or, finding reasonable cause, for other reasons. See
infra text accompanying note 259 (discussing EEOC case selection system).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
160. See infra text accompanying notes 252-55 (discussing EEOC caseload).
161. See Turner, supra note 128, at 281-82 (noting EEOC's inability to process and
investigate charges in face of increased case inventory, loss of investigators, and budgetary
shortfalls); infra text accompanying notes 252-59 (discussing EEOC's problems and new
policy).
162. See John Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984, 989 (1991) (noting decline of class
actions and that only 101 of 7613 employment cases brought in 1989 alleged disparate impact);
Kotkin, supra note 150, at 1346-47 (discussing various factors that led to dominance of private
cause of action); Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily, WASH.
POST, May 12, 1997, atA1 (stating that number of class action lawsuits declined from 1100 in
1976 to 68 in 1996).
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fees to the prevailing party.163 Plaintiffs who expose discriminatory practices
help achieve the public goal of decreasing workplace discrimination, and thus
the public should bear this litigation expense. The Supreme Court has fol-
lowed the example of lower courts and characterizes individual litigants in
employment discrimination cases as "private attorneys general." " Individual
plaintiffs are Congress's chosen instrument "to vindicate a policy that Con-
gress considered the highest priority." '165 In the colorful words of one court,
an individual plaintiff "takes on the mantle of the sovereign."'66
Congress chose the private cause of action as the means to achieve Title
VII's broad public policy goal of ending workplace discrimination. Although
the immediate interest of plaintiffs is to remedy a personal wrong, when they
redress that injury they further the broader public goal of ending discrimina-
tion. The individual cause of action thus effects both the individual's right to
a remedy and the public policy goal of the statute.
C. Achieving the Public Interest Through the Private Cause ofAction
The following discussion analyzes how litigation furthers the public goal
of ending employment discrimination. Civil litigation accomplishes more
than a simple resolution of the dispute. For reasons that are explained below,
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994). The corresponding ADEA provision is an even
stronger endorsement of the public role played by individual claimants. The ADEA requires
courts to award attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff and does not authorize fees
to prevailing defendants. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1994)). The ADA provisions generally follow the Title VII pattern. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205
(1994).
164. See, e.g., Independent Fed'n ofFlight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754,759 (1989)
(stating that Congress intended plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees because "individuals injured
by racial discrimination act as "'private attorney[s] general," vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority"' (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1968))); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)
(stating that Congress authorized attorney's fees "to encourage individuals injured by racial
discrimination to seek judicial relief"); Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303,
310 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711,715 (7th Cir. 1969).
165. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434U.S. 412,418 (1978) (noting also that
award to prevailing plaintiff is award against violator of federal law (quoting Piggie Park
Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. at 402)). Consequently, prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII actions ordi-
narily receive attorney's fees, while prevailing defendants are not normally entitled to them. See
id. at 420-21 (prevailing defendant to receive attorney's fees only when plaintiff's action was.
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
415 (1975) ("[The Piggie Park Enterprises Court] determined that the great public interest in
having injunctive actions brought could be vindicated only if successful plaintiffs, acting as
'private attorneys general,' were awarded attorneys' fees in all butvery unusual circumstances.").
166. See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting special
responsibility in public interest of trial court to resolve dispute).
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judicial adjudication generates specific and general deterrence, educates the
public, creates precedent, develops uniform law, and forms public values. In
each case, the discussion compares the effectiveness of litigation and arbitra-
tion in generating these consequences.
1. Deterrence
As the Court acknowledged in Gilmer, deterring employers from discrim-
inatory practices is an important means of achieving the goal of workplace
discrimination statutes. 67 Nevertheless, the majority indicated that it viewed
damage awards as serving primarily a remedial function. 6 ' Notwithstanding
this view, the prospect of economic redress is an incentive to potential plain-
tiffs to bring suits in order to recover losses due to workplace discrimina-
tion. 69 Damage awards also deter potential defendants because violators must
compensate plaintiffs, thereby depriving themselves and/or their shareholders
of funds and profits. Thus, economic damages, by providing deterrence and
incentive, are a means of enforcing the law.
Title VII utilizes both remediation and deterrence.17 The original
version of Title VII authorized courts to order awards of back pay, instate-
ment, reinstatement, and injunctive relief.' Although it was generally
167. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (stating that
arbitration serves statute's "remedial and deterrent function" (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985))).
168. See id. The Court relied on Mitsubishi, which had stated that the damages provision
in antitrust law was primarily remedial. Id; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985); see also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987) (adopting Mitsubishi approach in discussion of RICO
damages and noting that Mitsubishi had emphasized priority of compensatory function over
deterrent function).
169. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,788 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging importance of incentive, in this case awards of
seniority, to achieve primary objective of eradicating discrimination).
170. See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 417-18 (stating that federal court relief under
Title VII not only compensates victims but also vindicates broader public interest in deterring
future discrimination).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) (authorizing court to enjoin
employer from engaging in unlawful employment practice and order appropriate affirmative
action, including reinstatement, hiring, back pay, or other equitable relief). The back pay award
includes lost wages, raises, overtime compensation, bonuses, vacation pay, and retirement
benefits and is reduced by amounts subsequently earned or that could have been earned. See
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 (1992) (stating that "[a]n employee wrongfully
discharged ... may receive only an amount equal to the wages the employee would have earned
from the date of discharge to the date of reinstatement, along with lost fringe benefits such as
vacation pay and pension benefits"); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211,
263 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that in addition to salary, "[i]nterest, overtime, shift differentials,
and fringe benefits such as vacation and sick pay ... should be included in back pay").
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acknowledged that these awards did not fully compensate plaintiffs,"r the
back pay awards served as some incentive and deterrence and thereby facili-
tated achievement of the statute's goals.73 According to the Court, financial
redress has an "obvious connection" with the primary purpose of Title VII -
to achieve equality of employment opportunity. 74 Employers who merely
faced injunctive orders to amend their policies had "little incentive to shun
practices of dubious legality.'
75
In 1991, Congress strengthened the private enforcement scheme by
authorizing courts to award compensatory and punitive damages.176 In author-
The ADEA damages provision incorporates provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 and is therefore different from that of Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). Like
Title VII, the ADEA authorizes reinstatement, back pay, injunctive relief, declaratoryjudgment,
and attorney's fees. Id Unlike Title VII, the ADEA authorizes an award of liquidated damages
equal to the back pay award in cases of willful violations. Id. Liquidated damages have a
punitive purpose. See Commissionerv. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323,331-32 (1995) (concluding that
"the liquidated damages provisions of the ADEA were a significant departure from those in the
FLSA... [and] 'Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature"' (quoting
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985))).
172. The back pay award did not fully compensate victims ofdiscrimination because it did
not include many of the expenses that victims of discrimination incurred. The scheme espe-
cially failed lower-paid employees, for whom the expenses of litigation exceeded potential back
pay awards. See Kotkin, supra note 150, at 1306-07. See generally Christine Godsil Cooper,
Employment Discrimination Law and the Needfor Reform, 16 VT. L. REV. 183 (1991) [herein-
after Cooper, Needfor Reform] (describing difficulties of minorities in litigating discrimination
cases).
173. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court limited judicial discretion in the award
of back pay because of the importance of the deterrence effected by damages. See Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (holding back pay should be denied only if
reasons for doing so would not frustrate central purposes of statute).
174. See id. at 417.
175. Seeid. More recently, the Court relied on and reaffirmed the importance ofdeterrence.
See McKennon v.NashvilleBannerPubl'gCo., 513 U.S. 352,358 (1995) (pointing outinADEA
case that antidiscrimination statutes share commonpurpose and stating" [d]eterrence is one object
ofthese statutes"). The Court concluded thatthe possibility of compensation encourages claim-
ants to bring suit and thereby vindicates the deterrence objective of the ADEA. Id.
176. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 1977A, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). The damages provision also applies to ADA claims of
disparate treatment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994).
Congress passed the damages provision to increase the remedies available to those who
had suffered discrimination at work. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254-55
(1994) (noting Act effects major expansion of relief available to victims of employment
discrimination in orderto further "Title VII's 'central statutory purpose' of eradicating discrimi-
nation throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past
discrimination" (quoting Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 421)).
The 1991 Act also responded to several Supreme Court decisions that "rather drastically
changed discrimination law to the disadvantage of employees and the advantage of employers."
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izing traditional tort damages, the 1991 Civil Rights Act provides an incentive
for individuals to file claims and thus to effect the public policy goals of the
statutes. The addition of compensatory damages makes it possible for injured
employees to obtain full remediation of their injury and encourages more
employees to take legal action. The prospect of increased compensatory
awards further deters employers from violating the statute.1"
Congress's provision of punitive damages is particularly telling." 8 The
purpose of punitive damages in civil cases is, as the term implies, to punish.
79
Cooper, Need for Reform, supra note 172, at 184; see infra text accompanying notes 196-98,
201 (discussing symbiotic relation between courts and Congress in developing law).
177. See Landgraf/ 511 U.S. at 282 n.35 (stating that addition of compensatory and
punitive damages "can be expected to give managers an added incentive to take preventive
measures to ward off discriminatory conduct by subordinates before it occurs").
178. The effect of the increased damages award, however, should not be exaggerated. The
1991 Act limits the combined amount of compensatory and punitive damages according to a
sliding scale that depends on the size of the employer. The maximum award is $300,000 for an
entity with 500 or more employees. This monetary cap excludes awards of back pay and interest
on back pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b).
The Act limits the damage award in other ways. It authorizes recovery of compensatory
and punitive damages only for disparate treatment claims that are not cognizable under 42
U.S.C. § 1981. See id § 1981(a). It also specifically limits recovery of punitive damages to
those cases in which the defendant acted with malice or with reckless indifference to the
individual's federal rights. See id. § 1981a(b).
179. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 n.8 (1989) ("[P]unitive damages,
available in civil cases, serve punitive goals."); see also Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S.
323, 331-32 (1995) (stating that Congress intended ADEA liquidated damages provision to be
punitive); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985) (same); Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (stating that § 1983 punitive damages punish outrageous
conduct).
The aim of punishment is reflected in the standards for awarding punitive damages in civil
actions. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 617 (1993) (reaffrming that "the
Thurston definition of 'willful' - that the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard
for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute - applies to all disparate
treatment cases under the ADEA"); Wade, 461 U.S. at 56 (stating that punitive damages are
allowed in § 1983 action when conduct is motivated by evil motive or intent or involves
reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights of others); Rowlett v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194,207 (Ist Cir. 1987) (stating that in instant § 1981 action, jury should
consider "the grievousness of the conduct, the solvency of the guilty party, and the potential for
deterrence of the verdict" when determining punitive damages award).
The punishment function is also demonstrated by a key feature of punitive damages - they
are never awarded as of right. See Wade, 461 U.S. at 52 (stating that jury decides whether and
how much to punish defendant).
Recognizing the punishment function of punitive damages, the Supreme Court has held
that excessive punitive awards may violate due process. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1993) (stating that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment "imposes a substantive limit on the amount of a punitive damages award"). The
Court has been less successful in articulating a standard to determine a due process violation.
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 395 (1999)
One of the purposes of punishment is to deter both the violator and a general
class of potential violators from engaging in future, similar conduct.'
Criminal theory, which provides insight into deterrence, justifies state-im-
posed punishment on the ground that it specifically deters the offender.' The
lesson is harsh: if the offender repeats the conduct, more punishment will
follow.' Thus, the punishment specifically deters an employer who has
violated the statute. An employer forced to pay punitive damages is unlikely
to repeat the discriminatory practice. Moreover, the employer is likely to
evaluate its other procedures and policies to ensure that they are acceptable.
More significantly, the imposition of punitive damages also deters
potential violators.8 The example of a sanctioned employer discourages
others from engaging in similar practices. 4 General deterrence more effec-
See BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (stating that violation of due
process occurs when punitive damage award is grossly excessive in relation to state's interests
in punishment and deterrence).
180. Itis generally agreed that all statutory relief must be available in arbitration. See Cole
v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 n.1 1 (D.C. Cir. 1997). As a threshold issue, the
Court has approved the practice of arbitrators awarding damages. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) (enforcing arbitral award of punitive damages).
See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization ofArbitra-
tion, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing concerns regarding punitive damage awards in
arbitration).
181. Deterrence is one of several justifications for criminal punishment. See JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRmINAL LAW 844 (1995) (discussing theories of punishment);
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIvENAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, CASES
AND MATERALs 115 (6th ed. 1995) (noting that "deterrence theories," under which punishment
is designed to deter commission of future offenses, "furnish a widely accepted rationale of...
punishment"); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scort, JR., CRuIMNAL LAW § 1.5, at 24-25 (2d
ed. 1986) (describing deterrence as theory of punishment); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1.2 (1997) (discussing reasons to punish those guilty of crimes, including deterrence); Kent
Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1336, 1340-41 (Sanford H.
Kadish ed., 1983) (discussing utilitarian goals ofpunishment, general and individual deterrence,
incapacitation, and reform); see also Jeremy Bentham, Principles ofPenalLaw, in THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 367,402 (J. Bowring ed., 1843) (finding that amount of punishment must
be sufficient to outweigh desire to commit same offense again); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law
andthe Optimal Use ofNonmonetarySanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM.L.REv. 1232, 1247-
59 (1985) (discussing criminal law principles under theory of optimal deterrence). See gener-
ally Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193
(1985).
182. See ROBINSON, supra note 181, at 12-13 (noting specific deterrence has more direct
effect than general deterrence); Greenawalt, supra note 181, at 1340 (noting that imposing
punishment teaches offender that repeating conduct will result in more punishment).
183. See Greenawalt, supra note 181, at 1340 (statingthatknowledgethatpunishmentwill
follow crime deters people from committing crimes and reduces future violations).
184. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (stating purpose of punitive damages is
"to deter defendant and others like him from similar conduct in the future" (emphasis added)
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tively induces compliance with the law than specific deterrence. First, it
reaches a broad class of potential offenders. It also creates spill-over effects:
punishment of one violation has a generalized deterrent effect on other, related
violations."' 5 The example of an employer sanctioned through public adjudi-
cation for racial discrimination in hiring may deter another employer from
gender discrimination in hiring or, indeed, in promotions. Second, the imposi-
tion of punishment stigmatizes the violator, and this deters other employers
who seek to avoid that same stigma.'86 A positive public perception is an
incentive for the firm to obey the antidiscrimination laws because the views
of potential employees and consumers may influence profitability. Stigmatiz-
ing violators also reaffirms legal employment practices and motivates law-
abiding employers to continue to comply with the law.
General deterrence requires public knowledge of disputes and their dis-
position. Potential violators can appreciate the threat of sanctions only when
they learn that similarly situated actors have been punished. This knowledge
enables them to "calculate the costs and benefits of engaging in the prohibited
conduct."'8 7 The public forum of litigation makes this information available
to the parties, to entities similar to the parties, and to the general public. Thus,
litigation of workplace discrimination claims furthers the public policy goal
of the statutes by generally deterring and educating prospective violators.
In contrast, the private and confidential nature of arbitration creates an
environment in which only the parties know about the claim and its disposi-
tion. 8 Even when arbitrators discover that an employer has willfully disre-
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977))); see also Rowlett v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194,206 (lst Cir. 1987) (upholdingjury instruction in § 1981 action that
explained punitive damages are awarded "for the purpose of punishment... and as a deterrent
to others" (emphasis added)).
The Eighth Circuit has explained that remedial awards "provide the spur or catalyst which
causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices
and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignomini-
ous page in this country's history." United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th
Cir. 1973).
185. See ROBINSON, supra note 181, at 12 (noting that contemplated violations similar to
conduct that was punished makes deterrent effect of punishment more likely).
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. For example, theNational Association ofSecurities Dealers (NASD), which sponsors
arbitrations in the securities industry, does not publish the awards or make a database freely
available to the public. Telephone Interview with NASD Administrative Office (Sept. 8,1998).
Awards are filed at the Administrative Office by case number. Id. The public can obtain a copy
of an award by completing a form, specifying the case-identification number, and paying a five
dollar fee. Id. The awards are available for a fee from private sources such as Westlaw and the
Securities Arbitration Commentator, which furnish access and search capabilities to fee-paying
clients. Id.
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garded the law and is subject to punitive damages, only industry insiders with
access to informal channels of information are likely to learn about it. Conse-
quently, arbitration forgoes general deterrence as a means of effecting Title
VII and utilizes only specific deterrence of the party to the suit. Arbitration
effectively forfeits the enforcement mechanisms of spill-over deterrence and
stigmatization because neither similar entities nor the public learns that an
employer has violated the statute.'89 Moreover, the specific deterrence that
does occur is not as "authoritative" because the ultimate decision is the
opinion of a private entity, the arbitration panel.
The Supreme Court, therefore, misjudged the effectiveness of arbitration
in vindicating the public policy goals of the statute. The Court also erred by
limiting the enforcement mechanism to deterrence. While it is important,
deterrence is not the only mechanism for achieving the goals of employment
discrimination law. The following discussion analyzes two additional en-
forcement mechanisms generated by litigation.
2. Development of the Law, Precedent, and Uniformity
Litigating the private cause of action furthers the public policy goal of
employment discrimination law by developing and refining the law.' In
order to resolve a dispute, judges invariably formulate standards, articulate
general principles, and issue interpretive guidelines. 9 ' The judicial process
thereby produces precedent and rules that influence the outcome of similar
future disputes. 92 Notwithstanding the debate about the extent of judicial
authority to make law, the nature of lawmaking inevitably requires some
189. See ROBINSON, supra note 181, at 13 (noting that deterrence by stigmatization
requires communication of results of trials to public); FRANKLIN E. ZIMGNG & GORDON J.
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 77-87 (1973) (discussing
threat of punishment as teacher of right and wrong).
190. The majority in Gilmer apparently accepted the proposition that legal development
is an important adjudicative function. The Court did not directly respond to the argument that
an absence of written opinions stifles the development of the law. See Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991)'(noting that NYSE arbitration forum
provided written awards, that judicial decisions will continue, and that settlements do not result
in written awards).
191. See William M. Landes & Richard A. PosnerAdjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979) (noting that any court system produces these services); David
Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEo. L.J. 2619, 2621 (1995)
(recognizing arguments supporting normative value of adjudication); Sol Wachtler, Judicial
Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (noting frank recognition that judicial evolution of
common law and constitutional doctrine is distinct form of lawmaking).
192. See Luban, supra note 191, at 2623-25 (noting civil adjudication creates otherpublic
goods such as advocacy skills of litigators, discovery and publicizing of facts, and authority of
courts).
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degree ofjudicial rulemaking. 93
Laws are often a product of conflict and compromise among interest
groups. Consequently, lawmakers may produce laws phrased in ambiguous
language designed to give no group a decisive victory. 94 Moreover, legisla-
tors cannot anticipate specific problems to which a statute will apply and,
consequently, cannot write laws that cover every possible situation. 9 There-
fore, disputes arise that highlight a statute's ambiguities or involve situations
that lawmakers did not anticipate. In order to resolve these problems and
ambiguities, courts must interpret statutes. 96 Judges and lawmakers act in
concert 9' as the judicial process augments and amplifies statutory law. 9
These notions of judicial and legislative interaction are particularly
relevant in the context of employment discrimination statutes.'9 Employ-
193. See, e.g., GUIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 6 (1982)
(describing dilemma of common-law courts in age of statutes); Abram Chayes, The Role ofthe
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1282-84 (1976) (distinguishing
judges' role in shaping public law from traditional conception of civil adjudication); see also
BENJAMIN CARDOzo, THENATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 13-19 (1921) (describing many
elements that inform application of law by judges); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 24, 263 (1960) (noting development of law is affected by
pressures of legal doctrine, temperament, occasion, epoch, and sequence of cases).
194. See Chayes, supra note 193, at 1314 (noting Congress is often unwilling or unable
to do more than express general policy objective); Luban, supra note 191, at 2637 (finding
dynamics of lawmaking captured in formula of contestation, compromise, and codification).
195. See CARDOZO, supra note 193, at 120 (noting that legislature "regulates in a manner
altogether abstract"); Wachtler, supranote 191, at 15 (noting legislative acts are essentiallyprog-
nostication; they are not direct applications of law upon people, but are estimates ofrule's effect).
196. See CARDOZO, supra note 193, at 16-17, 113-15, 129 (describing process as intersti-
tial lawmaking that fills in legislative gaps and forms cohesive structure).
197. See Wachtler, supra note 191, at 7 (characterizing process as "intimate law-making
partnership" between legislature and courts).
198. In addition to being necessary, the process may often produce better results. Consid-
eration of concrete situations results in rules that are more relevant than those Congress writes
in the abstract. See Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, I
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1997) (noting courts, in contrast to Congress, interpret statutes
and make law in course of deciding actual cases). In dealing with concrete problems, judges
see how statutes apply to real-world circumstances and how they interact with other statutes.
In light of this insight, judges fashion rules that fully implement legislative goals and avoid
unforeseen conflicts with other values and policies. See id. (noting manner in which courts
apply statutes). See generally CARDOZO, supra note 193; Wachtler, supra note 191.
Moreover, judicial development of the law may be more efficient than returning the issue
to the legislature because courts can often respond more quickly to new situations than can
Congress. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 548 (1983)
(noting time constraints limit legislative output); Kahan, supra, at 9-10 (noting time constraints
on Congress in face of reelection campaigns and demands of special interest groups).
199. See Wachtler, supra note 19 1, at 9-10 (noting thatjudicial consideration of discrimi-
nation now focuses largely on statutory interpretation).
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ment discrimination laws are phrased in terms of broad principles, standards
rather than rules, that courts must apply to specific situations." In addition,
Congress occasionally fails to forge a consensus in the particularly polit-
ically contentious law regulating employment and prefers to leave certain
issues to the courts.2"' Finally, ending workplace discrimination has become
more problematic as the face of discrimination changes and new problems
appear.
202
The history of Title VII offers abundant examples of the judiciary's
explication of the law and its response to changing patterns of discrimination.
To effect the purpose of the statute and to give meaning to the spare language
of Title VII, the Supreme Court has developed methods ofproving discrimina-
tion2 3 and continues to refine them.20 4 In the face of new and more subtle
200. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,24(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting Court's standard to determine whether harassment has violated statute provides little
guidance).
201. See generally George P. Sape&ThomasJ. Hart, Title VIIReconsidered: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972) (providing history
of legislative compromise necessary to enact Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1972).
Congress failed to achieve consensus in 1991 when it amended Title VII to codify the
disparate impact theory. Legislators were unable to agree on definitions of the key concepts,
"job related" and "consistent with business necessity." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)
(1994). Congress took the unusual step of restricting the legislative history the courts could use
to ascertain the meaning of those concepts. See ZIMMER ETAL., supra note 150, at 427 (noting
that "Section 105(b) of the Act restricts the relevant legislative history to one specific memoran-
dum placed in the Congressional Record").
202. A cynic might suspect that employers who support arbitration of employment
discrimination claims are motivated by a desire to freeze the status quo and end the development
of the ways in which discrimination may be proven. See Edwards, supra note 25, at 679
(expressing concern lest ADR become tool for diminishing judicial development of legal rights
for disadvantaged). The issue is not that simple, given that judicial decisions also work to the
advantage of employers. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
203. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988) (approving
application of disparate impact analysis to subjective hiring practices); Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (explaining why statistical evidence is persua-
sive); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,334-40 (1977) (approving
use of statistical proof in systemic disparate treatment cases); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (barring employment practices that have disparate impact upon pro-
tected classes unless practices are related to job performance).
204. See Burlington Indus., Inc.v.Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257,2270(1998) (finding employer
not liable for sexual harassment by supervisors if it exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior and employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of opportunity); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (holding fact-finder is not obligated to find
employer intended to discriminate when plaintiff proves that employer's proffered justification
was pretextual); Biggins, 507 U.S. at 611-12 (holding that adverse employment action taken
because employee pension was to vest does not necessarily establish age discrimination).
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forms of discrimination, the courts have been and are instrumental in provid-
ing redress to individuals.2 5
The authority of the courts to interpret and to apply the statutes comes
from Congress.2" Judges gain additional authority to develop the law from
their training, experience, and ability,2 7 as well as from institutional consider-
ations.20 8 The task of developing the law, which requires a sound understand-
ing of law in general and of current societal standards, is a delicate one.209
When a court missteps, however, its mistake and the reasons for it are mani-
fest in public records and written opinions. Appellate courts may then review
the decision, and Congress may correct it through legislation.2"0 Thus, judges
are accountable to Congress and, ultimately, to the people.
Congress has not authorized arbitrators to develop the law. Arbitrators
derive their authority to settle disputes from the parties' agreement to abide
by the decision. They are not accountable to Congress or the public, nor do
they formulate legal rules that are applicable to other parties or the general
public under the imprimatur of state authority. Arbitrators also lack the
authority that emanates from legal experience and training. Without legal
expertise, arbitrators may unconsciously use nonlegal values, such as industry
205. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998)
(holding Title VII prohibits same sex harassment); Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (defining hostile
environment sexual harassment); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)
(finding mixed-motive discrimination violates Title VII); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding Title VII prohibits hostile environment sexual harassment).
206. See Chayes, supra note 193, at 1314 (noting legitimacy of judicial action rests on
delegation of authority from Congress). See generally Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It's a
Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes That Create
CriminalLiability, 58 U. PrT. L. Rnv. 1 (1996) (discussing delegation of lawmaking function).
207. See CALABRESi, supra note 193, at 97 (stating "those who by training and selection
are relatively good at exploring and mapping the legal landscape can appropriately be given the
task of evolving the law").
208. See Chayes, supra note 193, at 1307-08 (stating thatjudicial process tailors solution,
ensures participation by those affected by decision, furnishes strong incentives for producing
information and argument, responds to grievances effectively, and is not bureaucratic).
209. See Wachtler, supra note 191, at 16 (noting that knowledge necessary for lawmaking
is understanding of "legal landscape," mix of common, statutory, and constitutional law,
together with present societal beliefs, understandings, and relationships not yet formally
articulated by government body (citing CALABREsI, supra note 193, at 96)).
210. For example, following the decision in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976), Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which defined discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy as sex discrimination. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978). Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 responded to several
Supreme Court decisions. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,250-51 &n.3 (1994)
(noting sections of 1991 Act that were drafted with "recent decisions of the Supreme Court in
mind").
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practice, to resolve an issue.211 Moreover, arbitrators may further stifle the
development of the law if they are overly cautious and slavishly follow, rather
than distinguish, precedents.
Not only are arbitrators without authority to develop the law, they also
have little incentive to do so. Because their decisions are final and limited to
the purpose of resolving the immediate dispute, arbitrators have little motiva-
tion to explain their awards in a way that makes them useful to future litigants
or the general public.2" Once precedent, which is composed of both judgment
and rules, is created, it becomes a public good.213 That is, many potential
users have access to this good, but no mechanism exists to compensate its
creator for its use.214 As a private provider of dispute resolution services,
arbitration will not produce precedent because there is no way to generate
income from it.2 ' The formation of precedent and interpretive rules requires
nonmarket incentives, such as those present in civil judicial systems." 6
In contrast, litigation occurs within a hierarchical institution that is
designed to produce a single, unitary law. Operating within this system,
courts create law that has precedential value and that can be applied to suc-
ceeding cases. Reliance on precedent is efficient in this system because
succeeding courts need not revisit issues that another court has already consid-
ered. Judicial rulemaking also leads to a body of uniform law whose applica-
tion produces consistent results.21 7 A uniform law, consisting of statute,
211. When arbitrators use industry practices as a standard, those whom the law seeks to
regulate define public rights and duties under the particular regulation. See Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("For
federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of forces that had
long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the chick-
ens."); Edwards, supra note 25, at 679 (imagining result had all race discrimination cases in
sixties and seventies been mediated rather than adjudicated).
212. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that arbitrators are discouraged by their associations from
giving reason for their decision).
213. See Luban, supra note 191, at 2623 (noting precedent and legal rules are public
goods).
214. Once provided, a public good, such as alighthouse, can be accessed by large numbers
of users. Because it is difficult for the entity that creates it to collect revenues from its use and
thereby recoup its investment, a single entity has no incentive to create the good. See generally
Landes & Posner, supra note 191 (examining problems of private production of public good).
215. See icL at 240 (examining problems of private production of public good).
216. See Hazard & Scottsupra note 9, at43 (noting system of public justice is public good
in that every potential user would prefer that someone else pay to keep it ready for use); Landes
& Posner, supra note 191, at 240 (concluding that private market will systematically under-
produce rules and precedents); Luban, supra note 191, at 2623 (noting that adjudication but not
arbitration creates rules and precedents).
217. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 6, at 1231 (stating that uniform law requires
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precedent, and interpretive rules, ensures that courts treat similarly situated
parties alike." 8 Uniformity ensures that responsible employers are not subject
to competitive pressure from employers who are not held to the same stan-
dard.2"9 Consistency between cases is especially important when statutory
claims are at issue because the raison d'etre of federal law is to achieve a
uniform standard on which the public may rely. 2
In contrast, arbitrators decide claims within a system in which each
arbitrator is independent and in which no correcting hierarchy exists. Conse-
quently, arbitration does not produce a uniform or consistent law. Should an
arbitration result in a new interpretive rule, it applies only to the case at hand.
Even if other arbitrators know about a prior arbitral decision, they have no
obligation to follow it01
3. Education and Formation of Public Values
Litigation of a private cause of action educates the community in a
straightforward manner. The publicity that accompanies a trial educates the
public as to the distinctions between legal and illegal employment practices.22
In this way, a public dispute informs employees and employers that certain
employment practices violate the law or do not bespeak discrimination.
Less obviously, the process of litigation is inherently valuable to the
community. Litigating specific issues gives concrete meaning and expression
single, socially binding interpretation of law); Stone, supra note 6, at 1043 (noting outcomes
of arbitration are variable, unpredictable, and invisible).
218. The need for uniformity can be quite basic. For example, until recently firms con-
sidered to be employers in one circuit may not have been so considered in others. See Walters
v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 206-07 (1997) (noting circuit split on
determining who is employer). The Supreme Court has only recently determined the proper
method of counting the number of employees, a calculation important when small firms are
involved because employment discrimination statutes exempt small employers. See id. at 212
(deciding method for determining number of employees).
219. See S. REP. No. 103-3 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7 (accompanying
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of5 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.)) (stating labor standards are necessary to relieve
competitive pressure placed on responsible employers by unscrupulous employers).
220. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 6, at 1231 (noting employment statutes are
congressional determinations that uniform standard is preferable to private arrangements that
are subject to market pressure).
221. In fact, arbitrators are free to ignore legal precedent. See Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,259 (1987) (noting that arbitrators have no obligation to follow
precedent). In this sense, arbitration is less efficient than litigation because arbitrators consider
each case without reference to similar cases.
222. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 181, § 1.5, at 25 (noting criminal law justifies
punishment in part because it serves educative function).
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to the public values embodied in a statute.' An alleged statutory violation
tests the values that gave rise to the law. Deciding these challenges in a public
forum imparts a sense of right and wrong, of acceptable and unacceptable
conduct. 4 In articulating the standard of acceptable conduct, an adjudication
reaffirms these values and forms community standards.' The standards then
govern future conduct. 6
The function of forming public values is especially significant when the
majority embarks upon an ambitious program, such as removing workplace
discrimination. 7 The task of forming, and indeed changing, public values so
that they conform to the law is particularly difficult when the law is misunder-
stood or is inconsistent with current standards." For example, an employer
may believe it did not discriminate against an employee if it made the adverse
employment decision without racial animus. The law, however, does not
require a hateful motive. Recognizing that the action may have been a result
of unconscious discrimination, courts focus on the effect of the employer's
conduct. 9 Ending unconscious discrimination requires decision-makers that
are aware of their own predilection for acting on the basis of stereotypes.?0
223. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALEL.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) [hereinafter
Fiss, Against Settlement] (noting adjudication explicates and gives force to public values);
Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALEL.J. 1669, 1672-73 (1985) (stating adjudication is social
process that uses state power to require reluctant to talk and to listen); Luban, supra note 191,
at 2635 (explaining that judicial involvement is essential good).
224. See Stone, supra note 6, at 1043. Ajudgrnent that a law has been violated expresses
the community's disapproval of the conduct. In the context of criminal law, conviction and
punishment help to form and to strengthen the public's moral code and create conscious and
unconscious inhibitions against committing the conduct. See Johannes Andenaes, General
Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIOLOGY 176,179-80 (1952) (explain-
ing thatjudgment has moralizing effect that strengthens inhibitions and stimulates habits of law-
abiding conduct and stressing that achievement of inhibition and habit is of greater value than
mere deterrence).
225. See McKennon v.NashvilleBannerPubl'g Co., 513 U.S. 352,358-59 (1995) (stating
litigation may disclose patterns of noncompliance resulting from misappreciation of Act's
operation or entrenched resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide
significance).
226. See ROBINSON, supra note 181, at 21 (noting law is relevant to networks of interper-
sonal relationships and shared social norms and prohibitions).
227. See Chayes, supra note 193, at 1302 (noting public law litigation is not dispute
between private individuals but grievance about operation of public policy).
228. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 181, § 1.5, at 25 (noting problem in context of
criminal law).
229. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("Congress directed
the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion.").
230. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Content ofOur Categories: A Cognitive BiasApproach
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Continual affirmation of public values through the civil judicial system en-
courages employers to evaluate the reasons for taking employment decisions.
Because employment discrimination suits often involve sharply contrasting
views about fundamental public values, they merit authoritative resolution by
the courts, which represent state power." The need for and benefit ofjudicial
affirmation of public values is heightened when, as here, the law is based on
a defining attribute of the larger community, that all people deserve equal
treatment.
In sum, litigation is more effective than arbitration in achieving the long-
term public policy goal of ending workplace discrimination. The public forum
more fully utilizes the tools of deterrence and incentive that Congress pro-
vided to achieve that goal. Litigation allows the courts to develop the laws in
a way that maintains their effectiveness in identifying and preventing work-
place discrimination. Judicial resolution of suits develops precedent that
ultimately creates a consistent interpretation of the law. As a single, unified
interpreter of public law, the judicial forum reinforces the public value that
workplace discrimination is wrong.
The Gilmer Court assumed that arbitration is as effective a forum as
litigation in which to achieve public policy goals. 2 But, because arbitration
is confidential, private, and final, it forgoes effective mechanisms - general
deterrence, education, development of law, precedent, uniformity, and the
formation and affirmation of public values - for enforcing the public policy.
The Supreme Court effectively limited the mechanisms for enforcing the goal
of ending discrimination to only one method, specific deterrence. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court erred in its assumption that the arbitration forum
would achieve the public goal of nondiscrimination as long as employees
could effectively vindicate their claims of workplace discrimination. Employ-
ment discrimination laws encompass two goals -to end discrimination and to
provide redress for discrimination - and arbitration is not an effective means
to secure one of them.
D. The Interest of the Employee
When Congress placed enforcement of employment discrimination law
in the hands of individual litigants, it indicated a preference for achieving
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995)
(noting cognitive mechanism of stereotyping influences and intergroup judgment and decision-
making).
231. See Edwards, supra note 25, at 678 (noting some disputes may not be resolved by
good faith and mutual agreement).
232. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
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social policy through individual self-interest. 3 Accordingly, the interests of
the individual litigant in choosing the forum and controlling the suit may have
influenced the Court's inclination not to distinguish between the individual's
and the community's interests. The following section summarizes the reasons
for supporting arbitration that are based on individual autonomy and control.
The discussion also assesses whether the effect of arbitration on public knowl-
edge and development of the law is insignificant because some parties will
continue to litigate their claims. The second section of this discussion consid-
ers whether all employees may achieve their interest in remediation through
litigation. The analysis reveals tensions between the individual's interest in
achieving redress for an injury and the public goal of ending discrimination.
1. Responses to the Public Policy Argument
The Supreme Court in Gilmer found it significant that parties may settle
a dispute during litigation. 4 The Court apparently believed that agreements
to settle and to arbitrate are largely analogous. Settlement does resemble
arbitration in that both are agreements between parties to end litigation upon
privately negotiated terms. Settlement is fundamentally different, however,
because the parties decide on the terms of resolution, whereas in an arbitration
the parties submit to the external judgment of a third party. 5 Thus, settle-
ment is not an alternative to litigation; it is an alternative to third-party judg-
ment. Also, the decision to settle is not analogous to the decision to waive
prospectively the litigation forum. 6 Settlement occurs after the dispute has
arisen, and the aggrieved individual understands the nature of the claim and
has access to legal advice. Moreover, settlement depends upon and is thus an
inherent part of litigation. 7 Rather than opting out of litigation, the party that
233. See SamuelR. Gross&KentD. Syverud, Don't Try: CivilJury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 4 (1996) (noting cultural value of "preference for
private ordering over public control"); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 115 (noting advantages of
private cause of action over government enforcement: low cost, avoidance of difficult choices
of whose rights to enforce, containment of government power, and grant of autonomy and
control to aggrieved individuals).
234. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (observing that"settlements of[claims at issue] are clearly
allowed").
235. See Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 41, at 777 (commenting on
distinction between arbitration and settlement).
236. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 117-18 (discussing difference between prospective
waiver and settlement in terms of deterrent and compensatory effects of remedies).
237. See Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?, supra note 127, at 222 (noting that
settlement is based on prediction of outcome of litigation; arbitration is based on avoidance of
outcome of litigation); Yamamoto, supra note 24, at 1059 n.20 (distinguishing settlement from
ADR because settlement is "internal" to adjudication).
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settles has actually used the litigation process."
Finally, settlement is subject to the same critique as that leveled against
arbitration. Like arbitration, settlement allows the parties to avoid public
scrutiny, reduces accountability, and fails to create precedent. 9 Most settle-
ments do not further the public goal of ending discrimination because private
agreements, especially confidential ones, do not generate deterrence, develop-
ment of the law, precedent, uniformity, education, or formation of public
values. Private settlements do not provide either the assurance that legisla-
tively-mandated standards have been followed or a satisfactory explanation
of any variance from the law.24 Although settlement is consistent with
individual control over a suit, it does not produce effective mechanisms to
achieve the end of employment discrimination. Settlement, like arbitration,
may not be in the public interest.
241
Postdispute agreements to arbitrate claims present similar concerns
because they also remove employment discrimination claims from the public
realm. A postdispute agreement shares characteristics of both predispute
agreements to arbitrate and agreements to settle. Although postdispute agree-
ments to arbitrate resemble predispute agreements to arbitrate because they
also forfeit the enforcement mechanisms provided by litigation, they are also
like settlements because they occur after the merits of a dispute have been
weighed. Thus, courts and those who oppose predispute agreements generally
accept postdispute agreements, which are notviewed as coercive, involuntary,
and unknowing agreements.24 2 In contrast to predispute agreements, employ-
238. The decision to settle is made after the dispute has arisen and, by definition, after
litigation has begun. The degree of reliance on the litigation process varies according to the
point at which settlement is achieved. Parties who settle after assessing the factual strength of
their cases following discovery have used litigation procedure. Parties who settle after evaluat-
ing the strength of their respective legal positions based on the court's disposition of pretrial
motions have been accorded judicial determinations. The assessment preceding a settlement
is also based on an evaluation of the facts of the particular case in light of controlling precedent,
again utilizing litigation in the form of prior cases. Settlements that occur after summary
judgment can fairly be said to have been litigated.
239. See generally Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 223 (questioning enthusiasm for
settlement and viewing it as problematic).
240. See Edwards, supra note 25, at 678 ("The mere resolution of a dispute is not proof
that the public interest has been served.").
241. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 223, at 1075 ("Like plea bargaining, settle-
ment is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor
praised.").
242. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (noting that peti-
tioner could waive right to Title VII action as part of voluntary settlement); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (stating waiver of judicial forum in advance of controversy was not
enforceable and leaving open prospect that postdispute waivers might be arbitrable), overruled
by Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); id. at 438
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ees who sign postdispute agreements are in a position to evaluate the advan-
tages and disadvantages of their choice.243 After a dispute materializes, the
employee knows that the dispute concerns a statutory right and has an oppor-
tunity to assess with counsel the likelihood of obtaining a remedy. Thus, a
closer fit exists between the public and private interests at stake;2' if the
evidence supports a finding of discrimination, the case is more likely to go to
litigation, keeping the matter in the public realm.
The Court in Gilmer again revealed a preference for individual control
when it noted that Congress had instituted a flexible approach for resolving
employment discrimination disputes.245 As the Court noted, employees may
sue in either federal or state court and may rely on either federal or state
agencies. These forums differ significantly from arbitration, however, be-
cause their authority to resolve the dispute rests on the state's power, rather
than on private agreement. In addition, the provision of multiple forums
encourages claims by giving employees a wide variety of options. Predispute
arbitration agreements limit the employee to a single option and, by eliminat-
ing all the other choices that Congress provided, diminish plaintiffs' incentive
to enforce the statute.2'
Finally, in Gilmer, the Court acknowledged petitioner's argument that
arbitration did not provide public knowledge and stifled development of the
law. In responding to those points, the Court noted that not all employees
would be subject to arbitration agreements, implying that sufficient judicial
adjudications would achieve those ends.247 The argument from numbers,
(Jackson, J., concurring) (expressly stating that present, as opposed to future, controversies were
arbitrable).
Notably, the recent legislative proposals would bar predispute agreements to arbitrate but
allow postdispute agreements. See supra note 8 (listing proposed statutes).
243. See Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 129, at 1346 (noting that premise
of voluntary postdispute arbitrations is that claims can be traded for money and therefore parties
may negotiate postdispute adjudicative process).
244. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 115-19 (noting postdispute agreements do notproduce
same externalities as predispute waivers). Schwartz notes that prospective waivers create
externalities by undermining public goals inherent in private actions and by affecting others
similarly situated. Id. at 115. He also notes that prospective waivers interfere with the tradi-
tional legal process by asking an individual to waive rights at atime when deterrent value to the
public is greater than compensatory value to the individual. Id. at 118.
245. See Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,29 (1991) (noting EEOC's
statutory mandate under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) to pursue informal methods and likening arbitration
to provision of concurrent jurisdiction of ADEA claims that evinces Congress's intent to allow
plaintiff to select forum).
246. See Shell, supra note 45, at 568-69 (noting that provision of multiple forums
argues against mandatory predispute arbitration because such agreements nullify statutory op-
tions).
247. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (predicting that courts would continue to renderjudicial
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however, is not convincing. First, it concedes the point that arbitration
produces private law. As developed in the preceding discussion, private law
and private adjudication are less effective than litigation in achieving the
public goal of the statutes. Second, the numberjustification does not explain
why the rest of the community should be satisfied with a less effective forum.
Third, the response does not address the wisdom of resolving some claims
through a private law system of arbitration and others through a public law
system of litigation.248 Finally, the Gilmer Court's reliance on a sufficient
number of litigated claims to achieve public policy is speculative and may
now be out of date given the popularity of arbitration and evidence of its
increased use.249
The arguments based on the analogy to settlement, postdispute agree-
ments to arbitrate, and Congress's provision of multiple forums share a
common element. While they are ultimately not determinative, each model
is grounded on the proposition that individual litigants should control and
manage their suits. This proposition creates a tension between the objectives
of the individual and the objectives of the public. The individual litigant may
settle, or indeed not file a suit; in these cases the litigant does not further the
public goal of ending discrimination. The following inquiry into the individ-
ual's interest in a remedy, the second goal of the statute, continues to develop
this theme of tension between private and public goals.
2. Effecting the Individual's Remedial Goal Through Litigation
The employment discrimination statutes provide a remedy to individuals
who are subject to discriminatory policies or practices at work; those injured
by discriminatory decisions or policies may file individual lawsuits seeking
damages. Unfortunately, employees who turn to the EEOC and to the civil
justice system face a problematic endeavor because neither the EEOC nor the
civil justice system resolves employment disputes in a timely or cost-effective
manner. 
0
decisions because it was unlikely that all or even most ADEA claimants would be subject to
arbitration agreements).
248. See Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 129, at 1356 (distinguishing
"private law" from "public law").
249. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 199
n.12 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting that developments since Gilmer may have "overtaken" Court's
premise).
250. Because Congress has not provided the EEOC with the financial resources necessary
to cope with the increased number of employment discrimination claims, the EEOC and the
civil justice system face significant problems. See Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer
and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMPL. POL'Y J. 221, 245 (1997) (noting lack of additional
funding to address increasing numbers of claims); McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra
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Employment discrimination suits begin when an aggrieved worker files
a claim with the EEOC." In fiscal year 1994, the EEOC received 91,189 new
claims.2 It brought 71,563 to conclusion, 3 resulting in the addition of
nearly 20,000 claims to the agency's backlog of unresolved claims.' In the
third quarter of fiscal year 1995, the pending backlog of claims numbered
111,345," and the EEOC took 328 days to process a claim in 1994. 6
Moreover, the EEOC discharged approximately one-half of these claims by
issuing right-to-sue letters. 7
More recently, the agency has adopted policies that use its resources
more effectively and appears to have reduced its backlog. 8 The EEOC now
carefully chooses the cases it will bring to court, selecting only those that
involve claims of egregious violations, novel questions of law, or areas of the
law that the EEOC wants to develop. 9 Under these new policies, the agency
note 126, at 1453 (noting devastating effect of ever-growing backlog, new enforcement respon-
sibilities from ADA, and fiscal restraint on EEOC); Turner, supra note 128, at 282 (noting
EEOC's $5 million budgetary shortfall in 1994). The civil justice system suffers from similar
problems. See Hazard & Scott, supra note 9, at 44 (noting Americans' predilection to aspire
to higher standard ofjudicial service than they are willing to pay for).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 154-62 (explaining enforcement system).
252. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 8, tbl.
1 (1994) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting number of EEOC charge receipts in fiscal
years 1993 and 1994).
253. See id. at 11, tbl. 5 (listing number of charges resolved by year).
254. See id. at 12, tbl. 7 (reporting number of charges awaiting resolution at year's end).
255. See EEOC: Commissioners Question General Counsel About Drop in Number of
Cases Litigated, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 205, at A-14 (Oct. 23, 1996) (relating size of
agency's backlog in 1995 and 1996).
256. See Statement of EEOC Chairman Casellas Before Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee May 23, 1995, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at E-6 (May 24, 1995)
[hereinafter Casellas Statement].
257. Approximately 50% ofthe 1994 discharge claims were based on no-cause determina-
tions, and those claimants received right-to-sue letters. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 252,
at 11-12, tbl. 5.
According to data supplied by the federal courts, the agency filed 410 lawsuits in 1995.
Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1431 (1998). The EEOC's reports disclose that the
agency received a total of 87,529 charges in fiscal year 1995. See U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,AllStatutes: FY1992- FY1998 <http'J/www.eeoc.gov/stats/notable/
all.html> (visited Apr. 1, 1999).
258. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Pending Inventory
Drops Below 58,000 in Third Quarter FY 1998 <http://www.eeoc.gov/pressl8-12-98.html>
(visited Apr. 1, 1999) (discussing new charge handling procedures that agency credits with
dramatically decreasing backlog).
259. See Casellas Statement, supra note 256, at E-7 - E-8 (reporting EEOC explanation
of policy); EEOC Adopts Charge-Priority System, 149 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Analysis/News and
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will undoubtedly issue more right-to-sue letters, returning cases that do not fit
the EEOC's priority system to the individual litigant. The cumulative effect
of the increased number of claims, funding deficiencies, and new policies
propels more employees into private litigation. Litigation, however, presents
considerable obstacles.
One commission has described litigation as a "less-than-ideal method"
of resolving some employee's claims.2" Employment discrimination suits can
be extremely expensive. Most employees base their discrimination claims on
allegations of intentional discrimination that require extensive, expensive
discovery." Pretrial motion practice adds another significant expense. 62
Mid- and lower-wage workers are often unable to finance litigation or other-
wise surmount these financial barriers.263 Lower-wage workers, and to a
lesser extent mid-wage workers, are less likely than higher-paid professionals
to receive a large monetary award, so initiating a case may be hard for them
tojustify' The cost of litigation remains fairly constant across cases, while
the rewards for success are, in part, a function of lost wages.265 This fact
complicates the employee's problem of obtaining counsel willing to litigate
the case for a contingent fee. Because attorneys only receive payment when
the plaintiff prevails, lawyers cannot risk cases involving employment prac-
tices that are not clearly discriminatory or based on egregious facts. 66 Some
employees, therefore, may find themselves unable to file a lawsuit.26 In these
Background Information) (BNA) 13-14 (May 1, 1995) (explaining that agency will categorize
cases by levels of priority, encourage settlement, and give greater authority and discretion to
regional attorneys). In addition, the agency has rescinded its "full remedies" approach, as well
as its policy that recommended litigation of all "cause" cases in which conciliation failed. See
Casellas Statement, supra note 256, at E-7.
260. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, CoMMIssION ON THE FUTURE OF WoRKER-MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS 30 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP REPORT].
261. See McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 126, at 1454 (observing that costs
ofdiscovery indiscrimination cases createsubstantial barriers to "all butthe wealthiest litigants").
262. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Seres., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting
"relatively few employees survive the procedural hurdles necessary to take a case to trial in
federal courts").
263. See DUNLOP REPORT, supra note 260, at 30 (commenting that "lower-wage workers
are less able to afford the time required to pursue a court complaint").
264. See id.
265. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 162, at 1006-11 (noting that litigation is cost-
effective alternative for highly paid employees because they receive higher damages).
266. See Theodore St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination
Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 7 (1998)
(reporting that "good" plaintiffs' attorneys accept 1 in 100 claimants as clients).
267. See FitzGibbon, supra note 250, at 255 (great number of employees "have no forum
because the EEOC cannot pursue their claims and because of the obstacles in getting to court").
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situations, one of the goals of the statute, to provide a remedy for discrimina-
tory employment practices, is not met.268
In addition, all parties in civil suits face long waiting periods because of
scheduling problems on overcrowded civil dockets, and the delay may dis-
courage suits.2 69 Deferral of resolution is especially problematic for those
employees who hope to keep their jobs because the delays of litigation make
reinstatement less likely.27 0 Arbitration, which may avoid the twin perils of
time and money, provides an alternative for employees left stranded by the
failings of the EEOC and the judicial system.27'
In sum, arguments alluding to the right to settle and the provision of
multiple forums reflect a deference to individual autonomy and control over
lawsuits. Those individual interests and Title VII's goal of providing remedi-
ation for injury also point to the need of many employees for a less expensive
forum such as arbitration. Nevertheless, as explained earlier, arbitration is not
as effective as litigation in achieving the public goal of ending discrimina-
tion.272 A possible resolution is to modify arbitration so that it generates the
268. Because vindication of the public interest in ending discrimination is largely a
function of the number of individual claims, barriers to litigation may also prevent achievement
of the public policy goals. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A
Philosophical andDemocratic Defense ofSettlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663,2669
n.32 (1995) (noting that if employees cannot get what they want from civil justice system, they
will simply not file claims).
This criticism of litigation rests on the presumption articulated by the Supreme Court in
Gilmer and accepted for purposes of argument that arbitration is an effective forum for resolving
individual workplace discrimination claims. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). To the extent that arbitration is not effective, however, this assumption
is flawed because an increased number of ineffective arbitrations will not serve public or
individual interests.
269. In 1994, the median time from case filing to trial in the federal courts was nineteen
months. See ADMfNsTRAT vE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ACTIvrTES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS tbl. C-5 (1994).
270. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting
litigation is less useful for employees who wish to remain in their jobs (quoting DUNLOP
REPORT, supra note 260, at 30)); FitzGibbon, supra note 250, at 249 (noting that adversarial
nature of litigation fosters hostility between parties that makes reinstatement impossible).
Even in discharge cases, a worker may prefer the remedy of a reinstatement that offers a
job and future wages over a monetary award. See Theodore St. Antoine, The Making of the
Model Employment Termination Act, 69 WASH. L. REv. 361, 375 (1994) (noting benefits of
reinstatement include restored opportunity to exercise acquired skills).
271. See Turner, supra note 128, at 280-84 (concluding that prompt and less expensive
access to forum in light of backlog of courts and EEOC supports arbitration of employment
discrimination claims).
272. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.B, & IV.C.
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enforcement mechanisms of litigation. One way to accomplish this is to
institutejudicial review of arbitration awards involving employment discrimi-
nation claims.
V Reintroducing Public Policy into the Arbitration Debate
Several commentators, who offer varying justifications for the proposal,
have advocated judicial review of employment discrimination claims.273 In
addition, Judge Harry T. Edwards, writing for the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, recently indicated that judicial
review is a necessary component of the arbitration of employment discrimina-
tion claims.274 Evaluating the possibility ofjudicial review provides an oppor-
tunity to discuss whether the addition of a public component into arbitration
can mitigate its private, confidential nature to effect an end to workplace
discrimination. It is also an opportunity to inject considerations of public
policy into a debate regarding arbitration of employment discrimination claims.
A. Implementing Public Policy Objectives Through
Meaningful Judicial Review
Any proposal to add judicial review to the arbitration process is multi-
dimensional. In addition to broadening the existing grounds for reviewing
an award, adding judicial review of arbitration decisions requires arbitrators
to issue written, reasoned opinions and to preserve a record of the arbitration
proceeding. These changes are likely to increase the cost of arbitration.
Nevertheless, judicial review may be warranted if it makes arbitration more
effective in achieving the long-term objective of ending discrimination.
273. Some commentators offer judicial review as a way to ensure fairness to individual
employees. See Gorman, supra note 4, at 669 (stating that review should "assure that arbitral
decisions will comportwith the law"); StephenA. Hochman,JudicialReview to CorrectArbitral
Error-An Option to Consider, 13 O1HO ST. J.ONDISP. REsOL. 103, 119 (1997) (recommending
that parties include option of judicial review when arbitration agreement is condition of
employment); C. Evan Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appeal: An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79
Ky. L.J. 347, 356-67 (1990-91) (noting that current standard of review does not guarantee that
parties' substantive rights will be fairly heard and properly adjudged and that in securities law,
a broadened right of appeal is necessary to protect complex substantive rights, to ensure that
absolute defenses to suit are upheld, and to prevent impermissible damage recoveries).
Others believe thatjudicial review will respond to concerns regarding public policy. See
Malin & Ladenson, supra note 6, at 1237-40 (concluding that nature of task ofjudging requires
judicial review); Malin, supra note 128, at 101-02 (commenting that meaningfuljudicial review
of interpretations of law is necessary to remove competitive advantage gained by some parties
when law is not enforced uniformly).
274. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487 (noting that "the [United States Supreme] Court has
insisted that, by 'agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive
rights afforded by the statute"' (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
32 n.4 (1991))).
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Litigation is an effective means to secure an end to employment discrimi-
nation in part because judicial resolution is public and official.275 By adding
the participation of public judges to the arbitration process, meaningful
judicial review would incorporate some measure of the enforcement mecha-
nisms of litigation into arbitration. Final resolution by the judiciary, speaking
with state authority in a public forum, would integrate reviewed arbitration
awards into the body of judicial precedent. Judicial review creates a public
record so that a court's review of an arbitration award furthers general deter-
rence as well as specific deterrence. Because judicial decisions are public,
accessible records, reviewed arbitration awards would inform the community
about the standards for nondiscriminatory employment practices. Federal
court review would also foster consistent decisions and uniform law. An
ancillary benefit is that the prospect of meaningful judicial review provides
arbitrators with an incentive to know and to follow the law and to accord
parties a fair hearing.276 Judicial review of arbitral awards creates some
measure of public knowledge, which generates general deterrence and educa-
tion; promotes the development of the law, precedent, and uniformity; and
facilitates the formation of public values.
The prospect of using judicial review of employment discrimination
arbitrations to introduce a public component into arbitration is not as drastic
as may first appear. Litigation in the civil justice system is not entirely public,
and arbitration outside that system is not entirely private.277 Arbitration
already has a public cast in that it depends upon the civil judicial system to
enforce agreements to arbitrate and to convert awards into enforceable judg-
ments.27 In addition, the organizations that sponsor arbitration have adopted
275. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14 (discussing characteristics of judicial
forum).
276. Ensuring that the law is correctly and consistently applied furthers the public interest
in ending discrimination. See Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 41, at 777
(noting tension between finality of arbitration and independent public interest in ensuring
correct, consistent decisions in which policies are neither under-enforced nor over-enforced).
277. See Robel, supra note 11, at 894 (stating models of litigation and arbitration occupy
opposite poles of continuum that ranges from purely public to purely private). See generally
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376 (1982) (criticizing managerial role
increasingly assumed by judges).
278. Similarly, the civil judicial system bears earmarks of a private system. Faced with
burgeoning dockets, courts encourage settlement and the submission of the dispute to dispute
resolution. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 211,262-63 (1995) (observing that in case
of state-imposed arbitration, arbitration process resembles adjudication); Robel, supra note 11,
at 896 (noting that as they limit public access and accountability by actively encouraging
settlement and other forms of"court-annexed" dispute resolution, courts move away from public
model and come to resemble private model).
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new rules to meet concerns regarding procedural fairness, 9 thereby moving
arbitration toward the litigation model.
2 0
Proposals to provide judicial review of arbitration decisions are also
limited to cases that involve employment discrimination statutes. When
parties contract to arbitrate claims of employment discrimination, the arbitra-
tor's work has public implications. In enforcing arbitration agreements, the
Supreme Court has allowed parties to assign the public responsibility of
interpreting statutory law to arbitrators. It is not unreasonable to suggest that
arbitration ofthese cases be reviewed so that the forum can better perform that
function.28' In essence, while adding judicial review to the arbitration process
279. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(discussing recommended procedural standards and noting those adopted by arbitration group);
Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 129, at 1349-52 (outlining American Arbitration
Association's adoption of procedural safeguards). See, e.g., DUNLOP REPORT, supra note 260,
at 30-31 (endorsing employer-employee consensus providing for neutral arbitrator, discovery,
cost-sharing fairness, independent representation, range of remedies equivalent to those
available through litigation, written opinions that explain rationale for results, and sufficient
judicial review to ensure result is consistent with governing laws); Mark L. Goldstein & Andrae
H. Stempel, MandatoryArbitration Clauses inEmployment Contracts, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 29,1996,
at 1, 4 (noting that JAMS/Endispute, for-profit arbitration and mediation organization, will not
accept arbitration assignments in employment cases unless agreement provides same rights and
remedies available under applicable law; permits employees to participate in selection ofneutral
arbitrator; allows independent representation by counsel; allows reasonable discovery; and
ensures employees have right to present proof though testimony, documentary evidence, and
cross-examination).
In endorsing the NYSE's arbitration procedures, the Supreme Court in Gilmer indicated
that the NYSE standard of procedural fairness is a condition of enforcing an arbitration
agreement of a statutory claim. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-
32 (1991) (noting NYSE rules include procedures for joint selection of arbitrators; disclosure
of possible arbitrator bias; discovery that includes document production, depositions, informa-
tion requests, and subpoenas; and statement of awards required to be in writing and available
to public); see also Gorman, supra note 4, at 639 (expressing view that Gilmer set standard for
procedural fairness).
280. See Stewart, supra note 273, at 349 n.9 (observing that "[a]rbitration now resembles
the civil litigation it was designed to replace").
An interesting development that illustrates the permeable boundary between private and
public adjudication are recent holdings that parties to arbitration agreements may specify the
scope ofjudicial review. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884,888(9th Cir.
1997) (holding that courts must honor arbitration provisions in which parties have agreed to
judicial scrutiny exceeding standard of review in FAA); see also Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding agreement that extended
judicial review to errors of law). Butsee ChicagoTypographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times,
Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that parties "cannot contract for judicial
review of [an arbitrator's] award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract").
281. In this vein, the addition of meaningful judicial review may ultimately enhance the
legitimacy of the arbitration forum, thereby increasing its attractiveness. See Gorman, supra
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may constrain the parties' freedom to structure a method of reaching resolu-
tion, it is similar to other regulations, undertaken to further the public welfare,
that limit private choice.
B. Prerequisites to Meaningful Judicial Review
The addition of judicial review significantly alters the arbitration of
claims of employment discrimination. It forfeits one of the key characteristics
of arbitration, finality, and requires two further changes in arbitration proce-
dures: the provision of written, reasoned opinions and a record of the pro-
ceedings.
One reason that arbitration awards are virtually final is that the cur-
rent standards for reviewing awards are quite narrow, making it difficult for
either party to obtain judicial review." 2 In order to enforce its arbitration
award, the winning party must request a federal district court to confirm
the award, converting it into a judgment.2 3 The party opposing enforce-
ment may request the court to vacate or modify the award.2"4 The FAA
confines the reviewing court's authority to vacate an award to circumstances
in which a party procured the award by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
in which evident partiality or corruption existed; in which a party committed
instances of specified misconduct; and in which arbitrators exceeded their
powers." 5 Recognizing these limitations, but noting that the FAA grounds are
not exclusive, the courts created a second standard, manifest disregard of
the law.2" 6 This additional standard, however, is sharply circumscribed; the
courts may vacate an award only upon a showing that the arbitrator under-
note 4, at 674 (predicting that judicial review which results in published opinions will "give
some assurance to the skeptics that important statutory objectives will not be jeopardized
through any all-embracing confidentiality of case law"); Malin, supra note 128, at 105 (observ-
ing that lack of meaningful judicial review discourages parties from arbitrating cases and that
adopting such standard may encourage arbitration).
282. See Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990)
(describing FAA standard of review as "extraordinarily narrow").
283. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994) (stating that parties have one year to seek confirmation of
award by federal district court in jurisdiction that made award).
284. See id. §§ 10-11.
285. See id. § 10 (stating circumstances in which district court may vacate arbitration
award). The courts interpret FAA standards to require that an arbitration hearing must be
fundamentally fair. A hearing is fundamentally fair if it includes notice, an opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence, and an impartial decision free from errors of law. See BALES,
supra note 6, at 135.
286. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (suggesting courts may overturn
arbitration awards when arbitrators manifestly disregard law), overruled on other grounds by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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stood and correctly stated the law but ignored the law or applied the law
incorrectly.
2 7
Thus, relaxing the standard of review is the first step toward providing
meaningful judicial review of employment discrimination claims. The reasons
for providing the review should guide the determination of a new standard.288
Judicial review would make arbitration less private, in both the official and
confidential sense, by integrating arbitral awards into the public realm.
Judicial review adds state authority to the arbitration process and removes the
confidential shield of arbitration. Achieving those objectives, however,
requires the appeal of a significant number of awards. This preliminary
analysis suggests that a generous standard of review is warranted in order to
obtain a critical mass of appeals that would incorporate a public component
into arbitration. Thus, the courts should apply a de novo standard of review
for arbitral interpretations and applications of law.289 While the reviewing
287. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-
37 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying manifest disregard standard to hold that award that contravened
SEC rule did not manifestly disregard law); see also BALES, supra note 6, at 136 (noting that
no arbitration award has ever been vacated on this ground).
288. A threshold issue is whether the standards of review that apply to labor arbitration are
relevant to the review of statutory rights. The standards for reviewing a labor arbitration award
are not pertinent to claims of employment discrimination because labor arbitration is grounded
in a federal policy favoring arbitration that requires the judiciary to defer to decisions taken
under collective bargaining agreements. See Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note
4 1, at 757-58 (justifying deference to labor arbitration because contract reflects likely assump-
tions or because substantive policy favors labor arbitration). In turn, this policy rests on a belief
that arbitration contributes to industrial peace or that it is the raison d'etre ofthe National Labor
Relations Act. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 38-45 (discussing labor arbitration).
The courts accord a virtually al-embracive presumption of arbitrability to labor disputes.
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960) (finding order to arbitrate will not be denied "unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute"). The courts sharply limit their role in reviewing arbitral awards. See United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960) (stating
that so long as award draws its essence from collective bargaining agreement, courts should not
review its merits). The arbitrator is said to act as the parties' "contract reader," and those
decisions become part of the contract. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581
(acknowledging that grievance machinery, heart of industrial self-government, molds system
of private law); see also St. Antoine, supra note 40, at 1138-44 (discussing role of labor
arbitrator).
289. See RobertN. Covington, EmploymentArbitrationAfter Gilmer Have Labor Courts
Come to the UnitedStates?, 15 HOFSTRALAB. &EMPL. L.J. 345,409-10 (1998) (concluding that
de novo review is appropriate only when arbitration award infringes protection of public law to
those who are not parties; when error of law affects only those who are parties, manifest disre-
gard standard is appropriate); Malin & Ladenson, supra note 6, at 1237 (suggesting de novo
judicial or administrative review of arbitral legal conclusions on grounds ofjudicial legitimacy);
see also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recommending
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court should not generally disturb the arbitrator's factual determinations,2 it
should analyze the substance of the claim and the arbitrator's application of
the law and should not be confined to procedural form.29
The second set of changes required by the addition ofjudicial review to
the arbitration process involves written, reasoned opinions and an accessible
record of the proceedings. In order to provide meaningful judicial review,
courts must be able to understand, analyze, and evaluate the reasons for the
arbitral award.2' Indeed, the Court in Gilmer conceded that written awards
standard of review "sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and
applied statutory law"); BALES, supra note 6, at 137 (suggesting manifest disregard of law
standard "will ensure that the most egregious errors of law are corrected while avoiding a post-
arbitration stampede to the courthouse"); Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 129,
at 1351 n.22 (noting that manifest disregard standard may be too deferential for arbitration of
employment law claims); Gorman, supra note 4, at 673 (predicting that courts are "empowered
to overturn... awards that construe or apply public law in a manifestly unreasonable manner").
290. It is, however, not easy to separate issues of fact and law. See Covington, supra note
289, at 385 (noting difficulty of distinguishing among questions of procedure, fact finding, and
interpretation and application of law).
291. An ancillary issue is whether the courts or Congress should decide the appropriate
standard ofreview. Because themodification should be confinedto employment discrimination
statutes, it is preferable that Congress act. As the discussion indicates, further alterations to
arbitration in the form of published, written, and reasoned opinions are necessary. See infra
notes 292-98 and accompanying text. The scope of these changes support legislative, rather
than judicial, action.
It would appear, however, that courts have authority to devise a broader standard of
review. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991) (noting that
while judicial scrutiny is necessarily limited, it is "sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply
with the requirements of the statute at issue" (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,232 (1987))); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614,638 (1985) (noting that reviewing courts can ensurethat"legitimate interest
in the enforcement of the antitrust laws [are] addressed" but recognizing minimal standard of
"ascertain[ing] that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided
them"); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (concluding
that Court endorsed effective standard ofjudicial review); see also Covington, supra note 289,
at 383 (noting it is "obvious" that FAA does not require "courts to roll over and play dead");
Gorman, supra note 4, at 672 (concluding courts possess powers ofjudicial review sufficient
to assure satisfaction of statutory requirements and correction of arbitral misinterpretations).
Precedent from labor arbitration supports the authority of the courts to institute meaning-
fuljudicial review. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,42 (1987)
(acknowledging that conflict with public policy justifies vacating labor arbitration award); see
also Gorman, supra note 4, at 671 (noting that public policy is stronger argument for vacating
award in commercial arbitration cases than in labor arbitration cases because they interpret
public law rather than private collective bargaining agreements).
292. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,436 (1953) (noting that beforejudicial review can
proceed, error of decision-maker "would need to be made clearly to appear"), overruled on other
grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); id.
at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (requiring appropriate means for judicial scrutiny).
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are necessary to ensure, among other goals, judicial review.293 To provide a
basis for meaningful judicial review, arbitration awards must be reduced to
writing and include the factual and legal reasons for the award. 94 At a
minimum, the awards must make explicit the arbitrator's findings of fact and
conclusions of law.295 The rationale for the decision should be clear, and the
opinion should include a discussion of legal authority when appropriate. In
addition, the parties and reviewing courts must have available an accessible
record of the proceeding.
In addition to being a prerequisite to judicial review, written, reasoned
opinions further the employee's interest in obtaining a remedy. Such opinions
ensure that arbitral decisions conform to the statutory norm and provide
another incentive for arbitrators to function impartially.2" Individual employ-
ees would also benefit if all arbitration awards were available to the public.297
Publication allows public scrutiny of awards and offers employees access to
information about arbitration and to facts about specific employers and arbitra-
tors. Thus, arbitrators become accountable to the public and to Congress.29
293. See Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,31-32 (1991) (noting that
NYSE required arbitrators to provide written awards detailing names of parties, summary of
issues in controversy, and issues in controversy). Nonetheless, NYSE awards do not provide
a reason for the decision or even state which of the claims, if any, were successful. See supra
text accompanying note 18 (noting that arbitral awards do not include reasons for decision).
Consequently, the summary notices mandated by the NYSE rules are not a sufficient basis for
review. See BALES, supra note 6, at 133 (noting that arbitrator need not give reasons for
award); Gorman, supra note 4, at 667 (expressing hope that "Court has not said the last word
about the matter").
294. Courts have resisted requiring arbitrators to provide a statement that includes reasons
for the award. See Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1413
(11 th Cir. 1990) (noting that arbitrators were never required to state reasons for award);
Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410,413 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding arbitration
rules do not require statement of reasons for award).
295. See Gorman, supra note 4, at 667.
296. See BALES, supra note 6, at 134 (suggesting also that written awards will expose
incompetent arbitrators).
297. See Adriaan Lanni, Note, ProtectingPublic Rights in Private Arbitration, 107 YALE
L.J. 1157, 1160-61 (1998) (arguing that public awards are necessary to deter employers and
to warn employees); see also Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?, supra note 127, at
214-15 (noting that confidential decisions hinder creation of precedent and development of
law); Sterlight, supra note 7, at 686 (arguing that published awards bring company's alleged
wrong under public scrutiny); Stone, supra note 6, at 1047 (observing that public awards deter
employers).
Given the development ofInternet publishing, this suggestion may not be as burdensome
as it would have been in the past. The entity that sponsors the particular arbitration, the AAA,
NASD, or NYSE, might be made responsible for posting awards on the Internet.
298. Some concerns about publication exist, however, and they illustrate the distinction
betweenjudicialjudgment and arbitration awards. The arbitrator's decision, while enforceable,
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C. Increased Costs and Achievement of the Public Goals
Judicial review of arbitration awards, along with the concomitant addi-
tion of written, reasoned opinions and accessible records of the proceedings,
will inevitably make arbitration more expensive.2' Arbitrators will necessar-
ily spend more time on an employment discrimination case. Therefore, those
arbitrators willing and capable of writing reasoned opinions may command
higher fees. Providing a procedural record requires a textual transcription of
the hearing, an additional expense. In addition, the cost of the appeal itself
will increase the expense of ultimate resolution."
The increased costs are justified because judicial review serves the
remedial goal of the statutes by ensuring that an arbitration decision has
correctly interpreted and applied the law. On the other hand, increased costs
make arbitration less attractive to all parties involved and may be especially
problematic for lower-paid employees. While arbitration may not be the most
effective means to achieve Title VII's public policy goal, its use may still be
justified if it offers an accessible process for accomplishing Title VII's
remedial purpose. If added costs make arbitration inaccessible to many
employees, the reason for providing it disappears."' Moreover, increasing the
does not speak with the authority of the state. Moreover, arbitral awards that have not been
accorded judicial review possess no precedential value. Thus, the awards may mislead the
public. This may explain the different judicial conclusions regarding publication. See Hazard
& Scott, supra note 9, at 58 (noting that private dispositions may limit damage to public norms
because they are not available to public). Compare Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32 (approving
NYSE awards that are made available to public) with Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d
1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (failing to require publication of awards).
299. Butsee Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487 (concludingthat "in thevastmajority of casesjudicial
review of legal determinations to ensure compliance with public law should have no adverse
impact on the arbitration process").
300. Meaningful judicial review of arbitration awards may also increase the costs of
operating the federal judicial system as the district courts and courts of appeals review the
awards. On the other hand, channeling cases out of litigation into arbitration reduces costs, and
the net cost may not increase.
301. One appellate court has indicated it will not enforce arbitration agreements that
require employees to pay their own fees, reasoning that this would discourage claims. See Cole,
105 F.3d at 1468 (stating that when employer chooses forum it cannot also impose costs that
discourage its use). Fees may discourage employees from utilizing procedures such as pre-
hearing conferences to resolve discovery issues. Id at 1477; see also id. at 1489 (Henderson,
J., dissenting) (chastising majority for reaching issue not required by facts of case).
One view in support of payment by the employer is that the employer can, at least to some
extent, spread the costs by increasing its prices. See Gorman, supra note 4, at 679-80 (noting
that employer who instigated and benefitted from arbitration process can bear cost as business
expense).
On the other hand, if each party pays its own fees, it may reduce the perception and reality
of arbitrator bias. But see Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485 (rejecting argument on ground that more
likely reason for arbitrator bias is promise of future work for repeat player, the employer).
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fixed costs of arbitration is notjustified if parties appeal only a small number
of awards.
The broader public goal of ending workplace discrimination alsojustifies
judicial review. 2 In this context, the issue is whether judicial review of
arbitration awards would generate sufficient enforcement mechanisms that
work to end discrimination. This result depends upon an efficacious balance
between costs and the number of appeals. One can only speculate as to
whether a significant number of awards would be reviewed. 3 We do not
know how many employment discrimination cases would be arbitrated or how
many losing parties would choose to incur the added costs of appeal.
4
Every arbitration also represents a missed opportunity for litigation.
Because arbitration does not generate general deterrence, its use forfeits that
advantage of litigation. On the other hand, judicial review of arbitration
decisions could develop discrimination law. But in order to develop the law
through judicial review of arbitration awards, parties must appeal a sufficient
number of decisions. Indeed, to accomplish the present level of legal develop-
ment, roughly the same proportion of cases would have to go to appeal from
arbitration as presently go to appeal from litigation." 5
302. See supra text accompanying notes 275-76 (providing reasons for instituting judicial
review).
303. From October 1, 1996 to September 30, 1997, 3091 "employment cases" were filed
in the federal appellate courts. The figure may include claims based on nondiscrimination
employment laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Table B-1A, U.S. Court of
Appeals - Appeals Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, by Nature of Suit or Offense, in
AppealsArisingfrom the US. District Courts During the Twelve Month Period Ended Septem-
ber30, 1997<http'//www.uscourts.govjudicial-business/contents.html>(visited Jan. 29,1999).
For comparison, the employment discrimination cases filed in United States district courts
ranged from 10,771 in 1992 to 23,000 in 1996. See Grimsley, supra note 162, at Al (relying
on data supplied by Administrative Office of United States Courts).
304. It has been suggested that a large number of employment discrimination cases turn
on factual issues rather than on interpretations of law. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105
F.3d 1465,1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Most employment discrimination claims are entirely factual
in nature and involve well-settled legal principles."); Gorman, supra note 4, at 667-68 (suggest-
ing that many public law claims concern factual findings and thus only few cases would be
reviewed because they do not involve complex examinations of precedent that could result in
error).
To the extent this is correct, fewer employment discrimination cases may be subject to
appeal than other claims. But see Covington, supra note 289, at 408 (noting that even when
decision turns more on fact than on law, debatable legal points may require briefing and
argument). Professor Covington's view is borne out by the development of discrimination law
that shows discrimination cases depend upon the application of a developing, rather than a
fixed, law to a wide range of factual situations.
305. It is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify and measure these effects because the roles
of trial and appellate courts in establishing a particular enforcement mechanism vary. Trial
courts also develop the law, and appellate court decisions contribute to deterrence, although the
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Moreover, judicial review is not a panacea. While serving as a safety
valve to ensure ajust result in some cases,judicial review will not address the
structural problems inherent in arbitrating employment discrimination claims,
such as the incentive of arbitrators to find for the repeat player and the disad-
vantages of informal dispute resolution for minorities and the poor."° Nor
will judicial review address the problem that the agreement to arbitrate is
often based on unequal bargaining power. Finally, although the prospect of
judicial review and the review itself may mitigate or prevent arbitral error,
Gilmer suggests that some arbitration procedures, such as limited discovery,
are simply not subject to appeal.3 7
In sum, judicial review of arbitration awards will help to enforce the
public goal of employment discrimination statutes. Judicial review renders
arbitration a more effective forum in which to further both goals of employ-
ment discrimination law: to end employment discrimination and to provide
a remedy for employees who suffer discriminatory practices at work. How-
ever, judicial review may not add a public component that is robust enough
to compensate for the number of lost trials to justify its added expense.
Finally, the added expense would reduce access to the forum by those who
need it the most.
VI The Problem and the Prospects
Individual claimants, empowered by Congress and by tradition to choose
the forum and made responsible for enforcing the public objectives of the law,
may either litigate or arbitrate their claims. They may litigate in the public
courts, which offer an effective forum for achieving the public goal of ending
discrimination and for redressing their injury, but which are expensive and
time-consuming. Or they may choose arbitration, a forum that offers an
accessible resolution process because it is generally less expensive and faster.
This discussion has assumed that arbitration is equally effective as litigation
in achieving employees' remedial purposes. The discussion has revealed,
however, that arbitration is less effective in furthering the public goal of
ending discrimination.
The effectiveness of litigation in achieving the public policy goal of
ending workplace discrimination is largely a function of resolution by a
public trial at the local level may have a more immediate deterrent effect. It would seem that
both trial and appellate courts help form public values.
306. See supra note 9 (noting structural limitations of arbitration).
307. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (viewing
agreement to arbitrate as trade of trial procedures for simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration). The Court's reasoning and language would seem to foreclose appeal of discovery
issues.
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public, state-authorized decision-maker. Litigation produces enforcement
mechanisms, which further achievement of the public goal. The public
litigation process deters potential violators, develops the law, helps evolve
consistent and uniform law, and forms public values. When deciding whether
and to what extent employment discrimination claims may be arbitrated,
decision-makers should consider whether arbitration furthers the long-term
policy objective of ending employment discrimination. Discussions regarding
arbitration of employment discrimination claims that ignore the effectiveness
of the forum in achieving the public objectives of the statute are necessarily
incomplete."'
These conclusions may also apply to the arbitration of other statutory
claims that embody significant public policy goals. However, a general con-
clusion that statutory claims should not be arbitrated which is based on a
blanket distinction between private and public law is not warranted. Rather,
each cause of action requires a particularized inquiry to determine whether
arbitration furthers the policy objective of the statute at issue." 9 Although it
is possible that claims alleging securities fraud or antitrust violations further
public policy goals only when plaintiffs litigate them in court, one should
examine the goals of each statute to determine if their achievement requires
the enforcement mechanisms produced by public adjudication.310
Arbitration fails the public because it does not further the basic objective
of the statute. Conversely, litigation fails the individual employee because it
is expensive and lengthy. The tension between the public goal of ending
discrimination and the private goal of remediation, together with the ineffec-
tiveness of present enforcement methods, indicate that alternatives to the
present enforcement system should be considered.
308. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
309. See Edwards, supra note 25, at 672 (advocating analysis of specific public law issues
rather than attempting to formulate general principles regarding public law); Hazard & Scott,
supra note 9, at 58 (noting that "acceptability of the private system depends, in part, on the
substance of underlying claims"; for example, claim of race discrimination in employment may
invoke different values than those in mercantile disputes); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls
ofPublic Policy: The Case ofArbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'SL.J. 259,354-55 (1990)
(arguing for substantial contraction of public policy exception to arbitration).
310. For instance, the law governing antitrust and securities claims may be more certain
or may be determined through application of rules, rather than standards. Employment
discrimination claims are defined through standards that require judicial determination. See
supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. Employment discrimination is also arelatively new
cause of action, and courts have only recently determined basic issues such as who is an
employer and who is an employee. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 849 (1997)
(holding former employees included within § 709(a) of Title VII); Walters v. Metropolitan
Educ. Enters., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 660, 666 (1997) (finding that worker is employee under Title VII
for every day between time beginning employment and date ending employment).
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When Congress enacted Title VII in 1964, it split enforcement authority
between individual employees acting as private attorneys general and the
conciliation efforts of the EEOC. In 1972, reacting to the failure of EEOC
conciliation efforts, Congress reevaluated its earlier decision and authorized
the agency to file individual and group suits." The EEOC suits, in combina-
tion with private class actions, provided a means for furthering the public goal
of ending discrimination.312 The situation, however, has changed significantly
in recent years. Struggling to maintain its credibility in the face of a caseload
that exceeds its resources, the EEOC files fewer suits. 13 EEOC and group
suits are less significant today, and the private litigant's individual cause of
action is now the main vehicle to pursue the public goal. 14 As this analysis
demonstrates, when individuals litigate claims, it is an effective method to
secure the public goal. Yet litigation, which costs a significant amount of
time and money, excludes some claimants. 5 The burden of costly litigation
falls on private parties who prefer low-cost solutions such as arbitration,
which is less likely to vindicate the public goal.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 155-59 (discussing role of EEOC).
312. See generally Kotkin, supra note 150, at 1338-45.
313. Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes 160-62 (discussing currentcaseload ofEEOC and
its new criteria for deciding which claims to take to court).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 251-59 (discussing increased responsibility of
private litigant).
315. The crowded dockets of federal courts are also a factor in the problem of vindicating
individual and public interests in employment discrimination claims. Concerns about the
federaIjudicial caseload form an undercurrent in the commentary on employment discrimination
arbitration. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating Court's decision favoring arbitration of securities claims was
"no doubt animated by its desire to rid the federal courts of these suits"); see also MACNEIL,
supra note 15, at 172 (concluding "that a major force driving the Court is docket-clearing pure
and simple"); Carbonneau, supra note 127, at 1957 ("The Court views alternative remedies,
arbitration in particular, as a means of alleviating the congestion in the federal court docket.");
Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?, supra note 127, at 204 (suggesting Court less
interested in principle than in reducing workload of federal judiciary); Ann C. McGinley,
Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use ofSummary Judgment in Title
VII andADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203, 207 (1993) (noting pressure on courts to dispose
of employment discrimination cases).
The heavy caseload of the federal judiciary is a worthy subject of concern. See JUDICIAL
CONFERENCEOFTHEU.S.,LONGRANGEPLANFORTHEFEDERAL COuRTS 9-11(1995) (describ-
ing increase in civil and criminal filings); Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the Federal Judiciary,
46 SMU L. REV. 751, 757 (1992) (discussing employment discrimination suits' effect on
dockets). Nevertheless, one should consider other methods of managing the federal caseload
before concluding that the federal docket problem justifies arbitrating claims of employment
discrimination. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 1127, 1168-74 (1997) (reviewing proposals of Federal Judicial Conference
regarding disposition of criminal cases).
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Congress appears to have recognized that a problem exists. Rather than
increase funding of the EEOC, however, Congress added a provision to the
Civil Rights Act that "encourages" arbitration of employment discrimination
suits.316 Courts have reached different conclusions regarding Congress's
intention in enacting the clause.317 Notwithstanding that debate, Congress's
apparent, albeit perhaps limited, endorsement of arbitration focuses only on
one aspect of a dual problem. While supporting an alternate forum may
mitigate the problem of securing remediation through costly litigation, greater
use of arbitration makes it harder to achieve the public goal.
This dilemma calls for commentators, courts, and Congress to explore
alternative forums in which employees may enforce their individual rights and
achieve the broader public policy goal of ending discrimination. 3" As this
analysis indicates, the evaluation of any solution should include the effective-
ness of the forum in implementing the public goal of ending discrimination.
Thus, proposals for reform should maintain a public, state authorized compo-
nent while reducing the cost of enforcing individual claims.
316. Theprovision, addedbythe 1991 Civil RightsAct, provides: "Where appropriate and
to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative dispute resolution, including... arbitra-
tion, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under [Title VII and the ADEA]." Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1072, 1081 (1991) (reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
317. Two recent courts have held that the provision does not evidence a congressional
intent to endorse arbitration over litigation because the purposes and legislative history of § 118
indicate Congress intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. See Duffield
v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding compulsory
arbitration clause covering statutory rights and made as condition of employment is unenforce-
able), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 203 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding that 1991 Act precludes compulsory
arbitration of Title VII claims).
Other courts have interpreted the provision and its legislative history as endorsing
arbitration. See Suess v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting
congressional intent to encourage arbitration); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 881-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that Congress encouraged arbitration);
Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 53 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that 1991 Act
encouraged arbitration ofADEA claims); EEOC v. Frank'sNursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp.
500, 503 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (finding Congress's expressed intent to encourage arbitration);
Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447,1457-58 (D. Minn. 1996) (acknowledging
congressional approval of arbitration of Title VII claims); see also Abrams, supra note 58, at
552-59 (finding legislative history of § 118 inconclusive); Estreicher, Predispute Agreements,
supra note 129, at 1361 n.54 (same).
318. One way to maintain state authority in employment discrimination cases is to increase
the EEOC's resources and responsibility so that it can take more cases to court. Another way
to streamline the process is to provide either specialized Article I courts or administrative
tribunals that speak with official authority. See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1313
(7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting Congress consider strengthened EEOC enforcement or administra-
tive remedies); Tschappat v. Reich, 957 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D.D.C. 1997) (recommending
creation of new Article I court to hear employment discrimination cases).
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VII. Conclusion
A painting by Jacob Lawrence hangs in the small museum of Hampton
University. It depicts a dramatic confrontation that occurred in 1965 between
civil rights marchers and local law enforcement officials and townsmen during
the peace march from Selma, Alabama to Montgomery, Alabama. 19 When
asked why he painted the scene, Lawrence replied: "I thought it was part of
the history of the country, part of the history of our progress, notjust of Black
progress, but of the progress of the people.""32 His response reflects the belief
that workplace discrimination claims are too important to be left to the liti-
gant. Just as the confrontation on the Edmond Pettus Bridge belongs to the
people as well as to the participants, a confrontation between employer and
employee belongs to the public as well as to the parties. For this reason,
workplace discrimination suits should be resolved in a forum that can achieve
both short-term individual claims of redress and the long-term public goal of
ending discrimination.
319. CONFRONTATIONONABRIDG, 1975 seriograph, at Hampton University Art Museum,
Hampton, Virginia.
320. See id. (providing text of interview with Jacob Lawrence).
